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Showing posts with label Jurisprudence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jurisprudence. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 5, 2011

Islamic Law: "Abnormal Abuse of Rules Can Neither Legalise The Abusive Practice Nor Render the Authentic Rules Null & Void"

This is an excerpt from The Muslim Conduct of State by Dr. Muhammad Hamidullah

(1)As has aptly been said: "When stable communities whether Tribes, or City-States, or States of a modern type are permanently contiguous, customs hardening in time into law never fail to regulate their intercourse. Ubi societas, ibi jus; wherever developed communities are brought in contact with each other, judicial relations must sooner or later be formed not mainly by agreement, tacit or express, but by the very necessity of the case, and partly from the same cruses as those which working internally create states." 


(8) Law (Fiqh) is variously defined by classical Muslim jurisconsults. "The knowledge of what is for and upon one" is a definition attributed to Abu Hanifah) which in other words may be rendered as "the science of the rights and obligations of man". A late authority, Muhibbullah al-Bihariy, introduces this all-embracing subject in the following words  of his book (compiled 1109 H.) : " The science of ascertaining religious commands (regarding practical affairs of life) by means of their detailed guides." [By guides he means authority or source of information.]


(9) A glance at the contents of works on Fiqh would reveal that they embrace practically all the affairs of human' life, material as well as spiritual. In view of the standard definitions given above and is the face of the contents of works do Fiqh, there remains not the slightest doubt that international law, i.e. the rules of State-conduct in times of war, peace and neutrality, form part of the ordinary law of the land, the Fiqh. These rules of conduct are generally dealt with in books on Fiqh under the heading Siyar i.e. conduct,

(10) Here a brief expose of the origin of law according to Muslim jurists may profitably be added. They say that man must always do what is good, and abstain from what is evil, and take scrupulous care of the intermediary grades of plausible, permissible and disliked. It is, however, not easy to distinguish between good and evil, especially when the matter concerns the subtleties of a complex civilised life beyond the pale of ordinary commonplace things. 


Practical needs would have required the possession of the power to legislate (or lay down definitely grades of good and evil [in] each and every matter) in the hands of Man, either individual, as jurisconsult, or collectively organised, i.e. a State. Yet mere reason, regarded as the touchstone of good and evil, is not without grave difficulties. For it is possible, and also a matter of fact -- so argue Muslim jurists -- that different persons opine differently regarding the same things. 


The belief in Messengers of God is useful even from the point of view of jurisprudence, in so far as the awe and respect due to their persons lead to the acceptance of certain fundamentals without further dispute, wherefrom other and further details may be elaborated. For this reason, the Muslim savants are very thankful to the generosity of God that He gave men along with reason certain chosen human Guldes to help them in the conduct of life. These selected and chosen ones pointed out what God commanded, God the real Sovereign and Lawgiver, regarding good and evil. 


Muhammad has been acknowledged by the Muslims as the Messenger of God; and whatever he gave them in his lifetime, commands as well as injunctions, in the name of his Sender, God, was accepted by the Muslims as indisputably final and most reasonable. 


These Divine Commands, known as the Qur'an and the Hadith - as we shall see later in detail - served practically all the needs of the Muslim community of that time. But human needs multiplied later in such a manner that express provision seemed to be available for some of  the new matters in either the word or deed of the Messenger, who himself had passed away, disconnecting the link whereby Man could receive Commands from his Lord. The consequent result would have been fatal and the fabric of Fiqh would soon have collapsed under the strain, had not there been express provision in the law itself for further elaboration. Credit must also not fail to be given to the Muslim jurists, after the death of the Prophet, who not only discerned this elasticity of the Divine Law, but also utilized it to its fullest extent. In time there emerged a complete system of law which served all the purposes of the Imperial Muslims, even at the height of their widest expansion from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans.


(11) Thus law originated from the direct Commands of God; but the power retained by man to interpret and expand Divine Commands, by means of analogical deductions, and other processes, provided all that was required by the Muslims. In this way a dual need was served: that of sanctity to inspire awe in the minds of (hose who were intended to observe it, and that of elasticity or capability of development to meet the needs of times and circumstances.


(12) We have defined international law, first, as a part of the law of the land. The province of the law of the land is therefore, obviously, wider than that of international law; and we have no concern here with the portion of the law of the land which regulates internal affairs of the State or its subjects.


(13) We have also acknowledged customs as contributing to international law. No system of law can positively provide guidance regarding every detail of every matter. Completion of a list of obligatory and prohibited things, along with details of a certain number of permitted matters -- that is all any system of law can achieve Naturally the prevalent customs  general practice, and even innovations hardening in time into prevalent usage eye) regulate the relations in such cases. 


(17) It may be added that, for purposes of illustration, precedents from Orthodox Practice have freely been referred to. These alone are binding. Abnormal and temporary abuse or overlooking of certain rules by a Muslim State can neither legalise the abusive practice nor render the authentic rules null and void. 


http://muslim-canada.org/conduct_1.html This is an excerpt from The Muslim Conduct of State by Dr. Muhammad Hamidullah

Sunday, November 7, 2010

Imam Ghazali: Debate as a Means of Searching after the Truth

Imam Ghazali (1058 - 1111), Khorasan

...You will understand this ambiguity between debate and consultation when I relate to you the following, namely, that co-operation in the search after truth is a part of religion but has… distinguishing features and conditions.

Whereas debate as a means of searching after the truth is one of the fard kifayah duties, no one who has not yet fulfilled his fard ‘ayn duties should take it up.

Thus whoever has a  fard ‘ayn duty to fulfil, but addresses himself to the fulfilment of a  fard kifayah instead, claiming that he seeks thereby the truth, is a liar; he is like the person who neglects prayer and traffics in weaving and tailoring saying that his purpose is to cover the nakedness of him who prays naked because he finds no clothes. Such a thing may occur and is quite possible just as the occurrence of the rare cases which are the subject of research in those debates is possible.

Those who spend their time in debate neglect several duties which are, by general agreement,  fard‘ayn duties. Similarly, anyone who has been expected to return a deposit to its owner at once, but, instead of so doing, seeks refuge in prayer which is the worthiest of all obligations before Allah, transgresses because it is not enough that a person be obedient and his works constitute acts of service unless he observes therein the rules of time, condition and sequence.

Debate as a means of searching after the truth is justified provided the doer is not confronted with a more important  fard kifayah duty.

Thus whoever finds an important obligation waiting for him and turns to perform something else, transgresses. In fact he is like a person who comes upon a group of people and finds them, having been neglected, about to die of thirst, but instead of saving them by giving them water to drink, buckles down to study the art of bleeding, claiming that it is a fard kifayah and that unless the town had a bleeder the people will perish. On being told that a number of bleeders already exist within his region and, therefore, there is no need for his services he insists that notwithstanding all this, bleeding remains a  fard kifayah.

 Likewise, he who does this and neglects to give his attention to the calamity which has befallen a group of thirsty Muslims is like the person who devotes his time to debate while several fard kifayah duties remain neglected in the town. Thus several have taken up the profession of law(fatwa) while a number of obligatory duties remain neglected in every town and no jurisprudent ever pays any attention to them. More specifically let me single out medicine in which there is not, in almost all the land, a Muslim physician whose word could be legally accepted in important matters. Nevertheless not one of the jurisprudents has taken up medicine. The same is true of the Muslim obligation to enjoin what is just and to forbid what is evil1which is a fard kifayah duty.

A debater might perhaps be arguing in the midst of a hall draped with silk and among men apparelled with it, but would say nothing about it and instead would debate concerning a hypothetical case which might never come to pass, even if it should occur there would be several jurisprudents ready to attend to it.

All this time he claims that he desires to come nearer to Allah through performing the fard kifayah duties. It was related by Anas that the Apostle of Allah was once asked, “When will the Muslim obligation of enjoining what is just and forbidding what is evil be neglected?” To which he replied, “When the best among you take to hypocrisy and the wicked, to adultery; when government shall pass to the hands of the least deserving among you and knowledge to those who are corrupt.”

The third condition which justifies debate is that the debater should have the ability and right to form an opinion of his own (mujtahid), and should be one who can give decisions on his own responsibility without being bound be the opinions of either al-Shafi‘i or abu-Hanifah or any other imam, so that whenever he would find that the school of abu-Hanifah is right on a particular point he would hand down his opinion accordingly, just as the Companions and the imams used to do, and would ignore what the Shafi’ite school holds on the subject. On the other hand, he who lacks the right and the ability of independent interpretation (ijtihad), as is the case with all contemporaries, but would hand down his opinions on the authority of his imam, would not be able to reject the stand of another even though he should discover its weakness. Of what use to him there is debate when his system is well-known and his opinions are bound to conform to it? And whenever a doubtful point confronts him he would be compelled to say that the founder of his school might have an answer as he himself was not independent in interpreting the sources of the law. It would have been more fitting for him if his discussions were on points which lend themselves to two opinions, for then he might hand down his opinion in favour of the one and against the other and become thereby more and more disposed to one view and opposed to the other. Yet debates are not confined to this type of two-sided questions; often these are ignored in favour of cases in which the points of controversy have been fully discussed and decided.

The fourth condition which justifies debate is that there should be none except on actual cases or cases likely to be so. Thus the Companions held consultations only as questions arose or were likely to arise, as for example questions of inheritance. We do not, however, see debaters concerning themselves with the criticism of cases in which the handing of opinions has caused widespread tribulations. Rather they seek the spectacular cases which attract attention and consequently, no matter what the nature of the case may be, discussion of the issue becomes widespread. They may even ignore cases of frequent occurrence saying that they are reported cases or rare events which are not spectacular. That the aim of a debate should be the truth is nothing short of a miracle. They would also drop a case because it has been reported although the way to truth is through such reports; or they might drop it because it was not spectacular and would lend itself to little discussion. Truth, however, aims at reducing debate and arriving at conclusions concisely and not flatulently.




Wednesday, September 22, 2010

Questions of Direct Recourse to the Quran & Sunnah & Fanatical Attachment to a Madhab

Timothy Winters (Abdul Hakim Murad)

...Earlier religions slide gently or painfully into schism and irrelevance; but Islamic piety, while fading in quality, has been given mechanisms which allow it to retain much of the sense of unity emphasised in its glory days.

The reason is simple and unarguable: God has given us this religion as His last word, and it must therefore endure, with its essentials of tawhid, worship and ethics intact, until the Last Days.

Such an explanation has obvious merit. But we will still need to explain some painful exceptions to the rule in the earliest phase of our historyThe Prophet himself (pbuh) had told his Companions, in a hadith narrated by Imam Tirmidhi, that 

"Whoever among you outlives me shall see a vast dispute". 

The initial schisms: the disastrous revolt against Uthman (r.a.), the clash between Ali (r.a.) and Muawiyah, the bloody scissions of the Kharijites - all these drove knives of discord into the Muslim body politic almost from the outset. Only the inherent sanity and love of unity among scholars of the ummah assisted, no doubt, by Providence overcame the early spasms of factionalism, and created a strong and harmonious Sunnism which has, at least on the purely religious plane, united ninety percent of the ummah for ninety percent of its history.

It will help us greatly to understand our modern, increasingly divided situation if we look closely at those forces which divided us in the distant past. 

There were many of these, some of them very eccentric; but only two took the form of mass popular movements, driven by religious ideology, and in active rebellion against majoritarian faith and scholarship. For good reasons, these two acquired the names of Kharijism and Shi'ism. Unlike Sunnism, both were highly productive of splinter groups and sub-movements; but they nonetheless remained as recognisable traditions of dissidence because of their ability to express the two great divergences from mainstream opinion on the key question of the source of religious authority in Islam.

Confronted with what they saw as moral slippage among early caliphs, posthumous partisans   of Ali (r.a.) developed a theory of religious authority which departed from the older egalitarian assumptions by vesting it in a charismatic succession of Imams. What needs to be appreciated is that Shi'ism, in its myriad forms, developed as a response to a widely-sensed lack of definitive religious authority in early Islamic society. As the age of the Righteous Caliphs came to a close, and the Umayyad rulers departed ever more conspicuously from the lifestyle expected of them as Commanders of the Faithful, the sharply-divergent and still nascent schools of fiqh seemed inadequate as sources of strong and unambiguous authority in religious matters. Hence the often irresistible seductiveness of the idea of an infallible Imam.

This interpretation of the rise of Imamism also helps to explain the second great phase in Shi'i expansion. After the success of the fifth- century Sunni revival, when Sunnism seemed at last to have become a fully coherent system, Shi'ism went into a slow eclipse. Its extreme wing, as manifested in Ismailism, received a heavy blow at the hands of Imam al-Ghazali, whose book "Scandals of the Batinites" exposed and refuted their secret doctrines with devastating force. This decline in Shi'i fortunes was only arrested after the mid-seventh century, once the Mongol hordes under Genghis Khan had invaded and obliterated the central lands of Islam. The onslaught was unimaginably harsh: we are told, for instance, that out of a hundred thousand former inhabitants of the city of Herat, only forty survivors crept out of the smoking ruins to survey the devastation. In the wake of this tidal wave of mayhem, newly-converted Turcoman nomads moved in, who, with the Sunni ulama of the cities dead, and a general atmosphere of fear, turbulence, and Messianic expectation in the air, turned readily to extremist forms of Shi'i belief. The triumph of Shi'ism in Iran, a country once loyal to Sunnism, dates back to that painful period.

The other great dissident movement in early Islam was that of the Kharijites, literally, the seceders, so-called because they seceded from the army of the Caliph Ali when he agreed to settle his dispute with Muawiyah through arbitration. Calling out the Quranic slogan, "Judgement is only Gods", they fought bitterly against Ali and his army which included many of the leading Companions, until Ali defeated them at the Battle of Nahrawan, where some ten thousand of them perished.

Although the first Kharijites were destroyed, Kharijism itself lived on. As it formulated itself, it turned into the precise opposite of Shi'ism, rejecting any notion of inherited or charismatic leadership, and stressing that leadership of the community of believers should be decided by piety alone. This was assessed by very rudimentary criteria: 

the early Kharijites were known for extreme toughness in their devotions, and for the harsh doctrine that any Muslim who commits a major sin is an unbeliever. This notion of takfir (declaring Muslims to be outside Islam), permitted the Kharijite groups, camping out in remote mountain districts of Khuzestan, to raid Muslim settlements which had accepted Umayyad authority. 

Non-Kharijis were routinely slaughtered in these operations, which brought merciless reprisals from tough Umayyad generals such as al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf. But despite the apparent hopelessness of their cause, the Kharijite attacks continued. The Caliph Ali (r.a.) was assassinated by Ibn Muljam, a survivor of Nahrawan, while the hadith scholar Imam al-Nasai, author of one of the most respected collections of sunan, was likewise murdered by Kharijite fanatics in Damascus in 303/915.

Like Shi'ism, Kharijism caused much instability in Iraq and Central Asia, and on occasion elsewhere, until the fourth and fifth centuries of Islam. At that point, something of historic moment occurred. Sunnism managed to unite itself into a detailed system that was now so well worked-out, and so obviously the way of the great majority of ulama, that the attraction of the rival movements diminished sharply.

What happened was this. 

Sunni Islam, occupying the middle ground between the two extremes of egalitarian Kharijism and hierarchical Shi'ism, had long been preoccupied with disputes over its own concept of authority. For the Sunnis, authority was, by definition, vested in the Quran and Sunnah. 

But confronted with the enormous body of hadiths, which had been scattered in various forms and narrations throughout the length and breadth of the Islamic world following the migrations of the Companions and Followers, the Sunnah sometimes proved difficult to interpret. Even when the sound hadiths had been sifted out from this great body of material, which totalled several hundred thousand hadith reports, there were some hadiths which appeared to conflict with each other, or even with verses of the Quran. It was obvious that simplistic approaches such as that of the Kharijites, namely, establishing a small corpus of hadiths and deriving doctrines and law from them directly, was not going to work. The internal contradictions were too numerous, and the interpretations placed on them too complex, for the qadis (judges) to be able to dish out judgements simply by opening the Quran and hadith collections to an appropriate page.

The reasons underlying cases of apparent conflict between various revealed texts were scrutinised closely by the early ulama, often amid sustained debate between brilliant minds backed up with the most perfect photographic memories. Much of the science of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) was developed in order to provide consistent mechanisms for resolving such conflicts in a way which ensured fidelity to the basic ethos of Islam. The term taarud al-adilla (mutual contradiction of proof-texts) is familiar to all students of Islamic jurisprudence as one of the most sensitive and complex of all Muslim legal concepts. Early scholars such as Ibn Qutayba felt obliged to devote whole books to the subject.

The ulama of usul recognised as their starting assumption that conflicts between the revealed texts were no more than conflicts of interpretation, and could not reflect inconsistencies in the Lawgiver's message as conveyed by the Prophet (pbuh). The message of Islam had been perfectly conveyed before his demise; and the function of subsequent scholars was exclusively one of interpretation, not of amendment.


The Companions knew by ijma that over the years of the Prophets ministry, as he taught and nurtured them, and brought them from the wildness of paganism to the sober and compassionate path of monotheism, his teaching had been divinely shaped to keep pace with their development. The best-known instance of this was the progressive prohibition of wine, which had been discouraged by an early Quranic verse, then condemned, and finally prohibited. Another example, touching an even more basic principle, was the canonical prayer, which the early ummah had been obliged to say only twice daily, but which, following the Miraj, was increased to five times a day. Mutah (temporary marriage) had been permitted in the early days of Islam, but was subsequently prohibited as social conditions developed, respect for women grew, and morals became firmer. There are several other instances of this, most being datable to the years immediately following the Hijra, when the circumstances of the young ummah changed in radical ways.

The techniques of naskh identification have enabled the ulama to resolve most of the recognised cases of taarud al-adilla. They demand a rigorous and detailed knowledge not just of the hadith disciplines, but of history, sirah, and of the views held by the Companions and other scholars on the circumstances surrounding the genesis and exegesis of the hadith in question. In some cases, hadith scholars would travel throughout the Islamic world to locate the required information pertinent to a single hadith.

In cases where in spite of all efforts, abrogation cannot be proven, then the ulama of the salaf recognised the need to apply further tests. Important among these is the analysis of the matn (the transmitted text rather than the isnad of the hadith). Clear (sarih) statements are deemed to take precedence over allusive ones (kinayah), and definite (muhkam) words take precedence over words falling into more ambiguous categories, such as the interpreted (mufassar), the obscure (khafi) and the problematic (mushkil). It may also be necessary to look at the position of the narrators of the conflicting hadiths, giving precedence to the report issuing from the individual who was more directly involved. A famous example of this is the hadith narrated by Maymunah which states that the Prophet (pbuh) married her when not in a state of consecration (ihram) for the pilgrimage. Because her report was that of an eyewitness, her hadith is given precedence over the conflicting report from Ibn Abbas, related by a similarly sound isnad, which states that the Prophet was in fact in a state of ihram at the time.

There are many other rules, such as that which states that prohibition takes precedence over permissibility. Similarly, conflicting hadiths may be resolved by utilising the fatwa of a Companion, after taking care that all the relevant fatwa are compared and assessed. Finally, recourse may be had to qiyas (analogy). An example of this is the various reports about the solar eclipse prayer (salat al-kusuf), which specify different numbers of bowings and prostrations. The ulama, having investigated the reports meticulously, and having been unable to resolve the contradiction by any of the mechanisms outlined above, have applied analogical reasoning by concluding that since the prayer in question is still called salaat, then the usual form of salaat should be followed, namely, one bowing and two prostrations. The other hadiths are to be abandoned.

This careful articulation of the methods of resolving conflicting source-texts, so vital to the accurate derivation of the Shariah from the revealed sources, was primarily the work of Imam al-Shafi'i. Confronted by the confusion and disagreement among the jurists of his day, and determined to lay down a consistent methodology which would enable a fiqh to be established in which the possibility of error was excluded as far as was humanly possible, Shafi'i wrote his brilliant Risala (Treatise on Islamic jurisprudence). His ideas were soon taken up, in varying ways, by jurists of the other major traditions of law; and today they are fundamental to the formal application of the Shariah.

It hardly needs remarking that although the Four Imams, Abu Hanifa, Malik ibn Anas, al-Shafi'i and Ibn Hanbal, are regarded as the founders of these four great traditions, which, if we were asked to define them, we might sum up as sophisticated techniques for avoiding innovation, their traditions were fully systematised only by later generations of scholars. The Sunni ulama rapidly recognised the brilliance of the Four Imams, and after the late third century of Islam we find that hardly any scholars adhered to any other approach. The great hadith specialists, including al-Bukhari and Muslim, were all loyal adherents of one or another of the madhhabs, particularly that of Imam al-Shafi'i. But within each madhhab, leading scholars continued to improve and refine the roots and branches of their school. In some cases, historical conditions made this not only possible, but necessary. For instance, scholars of the school of Imam Abu Hanifah, which was built on the foundations of the early legal schools of Kufa and Basra, were wary of some hadiths in circulation in Iraq because of the prevalence of forgery engendered by the strong sectarian influences there. Later, however, once the canonical collections of Bukhari, Muslim and others became available, subsequent generations of Hanafi scholars took the entire corpus of hadiths into account in formulating and revising their madhhab. This type of process continued for two centuries, until the Schools reached a condition of maturity in the fourth and fifth centuries of the Hijra.

It was at that time, too, that the attitude of toleration and good opinion between the Schools became universally accepted. This was formulated by Imam al-Ghazali, himself the author of four textbooks of Shafi'i fiqh, and also of Al-Mustasfa, widely acclaimed as the most advanced and careful of all works on usul usul al-fiqh With his well-known concern for sincerity, and his dislike of ostentatious scholarly rivalry, he strongly condemned what he called fanatical attachment to a madhhab (Ihya Ulum al-Din, III, 65) While it was necessary for the Muslim to follow a recognised madhhab in order to avert the lethal danger of misinterpreting the sources, he must never fall into the trap of considering his own school categorically superior to the others. With a few insignificant exceptions, the great scholars of Sunni Islam have followed the ethos outlined by Imam al-Ghazali, and have been conspicuously respectful of each others madhhab. Anyone who has studied under traditional ulama will be well-aware of this fact.

The evolution of the Four Schools did not stifle, as some Orientalists have suggested, the capacity for the refinement or extension of positive law. On the contrary, sophisticated mechanisms were available which not only permitted qualified individuals to derive the Shariah from the Quran and Sunnah on their own authority, but actually obliged them to do this. According to most scholars, an expert who has fully mastered the sources and fulfilled a variety of necessary scholarly conditions is not permitted to follow the prevalent rulings of his School, but must derive the rulings himself from the revealed sources. Such an individual is known as a mujtahid, a term derived from the famous hadith of Muadh ibn Jabal.

Few would seriously deny that for a Muslim to venture beyond established expert opinion and have recourse directly to the Quran and Sunnah, he must be a scholar of great eminence. The danger of less- qualified individuals misunderstanding the sources and hence damaging the Shariah is a very real one, as was shown by the discord and strife which afflicted some early Muslims, and even some of the Companions themselves, in the period which preceded the establishment of the Orthodox Schools. Prior to Islam, entire religions had been subverted by inadequate scriptural scholarship, and it was vital that Islam should be secured from a comparable fate.

Sunday, September 12, 2010

Shariah: Framework for Human Rights at the Core of Islam as a Religion



Dr. Robert D. Crane

Over the long run, the most productive initiative by the still largely silent majority of Muslims in marginalizing Muslim extremists is to fill the intellectual and spiritual void that serves as an ocean in which the extremists can swim. This initiative can provide the favorable environment needed for Muslims to ally with like-minded Christians and Jews in order to show that classical Islam and classical America are similar, even though many people do not understand or live up to the ideals common to both.

This is the only way to convince the extremists that their confrontational approach to the “other” is not necessary; that the threat mentality of those who think only about their own survival and are obsessed with catastrophe and conspiracy can backfire; and that only those can truly prosper over the long run who can transcend their own self-centered interests in order to develop an opportunity mentality together with those who are no longer merely the “other” but now are a single pluralist community.


In order to fill the intellectual void, Muslims need to emphasize the universal Islamic principles, the maqasid al shari’ah, which spell out precisely what Michael Novak says do not exist in Islam. These maqasid, following the methodology instituted by the Prophet Muhammad and perfected in the architectonics pioneered six centuries ago by the master of the art, Al-Shatibi, are considered to consist of seven responsibilities, the practice of which actualize the corresponding human rights.


The first one, known as haqq al din, provides the framework for the next six in the form of respect for a transcendent source of truth to guide human thought and action. God instructs us in the Qur’an, wa tamaat kalimatu Rabika sidqan wa ‘adlan, “and the word of your Lord is perfected in truth and justice.” Recognition of this absolute source of truth and of the responsibility to apply it in practice are needed to counter the temptations toward relativism and the resulting chaos, injustice, and tyranny that may result from de-sacralization of public life.


Each of these seven universal principles is essential to understand the next and succeeding ones. The first three operational principles, necessary to sustain existence, begin with haqq al nafs or haqq al ruh, which is the duty to respect the human person. The ruh or spirit of every person was created by God before or outside of the creation of the physical universe, is constantly in the presence of God, and, according to the Prophet Muhammad, is made in the image of God. This is the basis of the intimate relationship between God and the human person as expressed in the Qur’anic ayah, “We are closer to him than is his own jugular vein.”
This is also the basis of the prayer offered by the Prophet and by countless generations of Muslims for more than a thousand years:Allahumma, inna asaluka hubbaka wa hubba man yuhibbuka wa hubba kulli ‘amali yuqaribuni ila hubika, “O Allah! I ask You for Your love and for the love of those who love You. Grant that I may love every action that will bring me closer to You.”


At the secondary level of this principle, known as hajjiyat or requirements, lies the duty to respect life, haqq al haya. This provides guidelines in the third-order tahsinniyat for what in modern parlance is called the doctrine of just war.


The next principle, haqq al nasl, is the duty to respect the nuclear family and the community at every level all the way to the community of humankind as an important expression of the person. This principle teaches that the sovereignty of the person, subject to the ultimate sovereignty of God, comes prior to and is superior to any alleged sovereignty of the secular invention known as the State.


This principle teaches also that a community at the level of the nation, which shares a common sense of the past, common values in the present, and common hopes for the future, such as the Palestinians, Kurds, Chechens, Kashmiris, the Uighur in China, and the Anzanians in the Sudan, has legal existence and therefore legal rights in international law. This is the opposite of the Western international law created by past empires, which is based on the simple principle of “might makes right.”


The third principle is haqq al mal, which is the duty to respect the rights of private property in the means of production. This requires respect for institutions that broaden access to capital ownership as a universal human right and as an essential means to sustain respect for the human person and human community. This principle requires the perfection of existing institutions to remove the barriers to universal property ownership so that wealth will be distributed through the production process rather than by stealing from the rich by forced redistribution to the poor. Such redistribution can never have more than a marginal effect in reducing the gap between the inordinately rich and the miserably poor, because the owners in a defective financial system need not and never will give up their economic and political power.


The next three universal principles in Islamic law concern primarily what we might call the quality of life. The first is haqq al hurriya, which requires respect for self-determination of both persons and communities through political freedom, including the concept that economic democracy is a precondition for the political democracy of representative government.


The secondary principles required to give meaning to the parent principle and carry it out in practice are khilafa, the ultimate responsibility of both the ruled and the ruler to God; shura, the responsiveness of the rulers to the ruled, which must be institutionalized in order to be meaningful; ijma, the duty of the opinion leaders to reach consensus on specific policy issues in order to participate in the process of shura; and an independent judiciary.


The second of these last three maqasid is haqq al karama or respect for human dignity. The two most important hajjiyat for individual human dignity are religious freedom and gender equity. In traditional Islamic thought, freedom and equality are not ultimate ends but essential means to pursue the higher purposes inherent in the divine design of the Creator for every person.


The last universal or essential purpose at the root of Islamic jurisprudence, which can be sustained only by observance of the first six principles and also is essential to each of them, is haqq al ‘ilm or respect for knowledge. Its second-order principles are freedom of thought, press, and assembly so that all persons can fulfill their purpose to seek knowledge wherever they can find it.


This framework for human rights is at the very core of Islam as a religion. Fortunately, this paradigm of law in its broadest sense of moral theology is now being revived by what still is a minority of courageous Muslims determined to fill the intellectual gap that has weakened the Muslim umma for more than six hundred years, so that a spiritual renaissance in all faiths can transform the world.




Dr. Robert Dickson Crane is a scholar and a prolific writer and expert on subjects ranging from law to economics to international affairs and Islamic jurisprudence.

He is a co-founding board member and former Chairman of the Center for Understanding Islam, and Director for Global Strategy at The Abraham Federation: A Global Center for Peace through Compassionate Justice. In 1962 he co-founded the Center for Strategic and International Studies, while remaining of Counsel with his law firm until 1965. From 1963 to 1968, he served as Foreign Policy Advisor to Richard Nixon who appointed him as Deputy Director of the National Security Council in 1969. From 1982 to the present Dr. Crane has been a full-time Islamic scholar and activist.

Dr. Crane was a Founding Member of The American Muslim Council and from 1992 to 1994 served as Director of its Legal Division. In 1993, he was elected president of the Muslim American Bar Association, which he founded in order to organize Muslim participation in the American Bar Association's work on issues of conscience. From 1994 until the present he has headed his own research organizations [Santa Fe, New Mexico] focusing on paradigm management designed to shape the agendas of think tanks, which, in turn, direct public policy.


Wednesday, September 8, 2010

Shariah, Globalism, Media, Muslim Extremists, Stoning-Beheading-Flogging, Hate Crime & Christian Extremism

1. Dr Hamdy MuradProfessor of Sharia at Al-Balqa Applied UniversityJordan

The regulations of Sharia can only be applied in a mature, Islamic educated society that is familiar with the respective regulations, morals and laws. This is a principal issue. These regulations should not be applied in an Islamic society that is not mature or in which the reasons of righteousness are absent.

We do not deny what is stated in the Koran or what is agreed upon by all scholars. The conditions stated for executing the death penalty are very balanced and show an outstanding miracle and accurate balance. On the one hand, they demand that the regulations be applied and on the other they prevent them from being applied, according to regulations and conditions. Accordingly, the purpose is not only deterrence, but also establishing justice, considering the spiritual, social, moral and educational aspects. There is a group of factors that interact with the soul. Absolutely, the death penalty must be imposed on the murderer. Yet, when we explore the conditions and details, we find that Islam is much more merciful than all the laws applied on earth. Avoiding punishment in secular laws results in injustice, while the conditions and regulations set to avert the death penalty signifies the utmost Islamic Justice.

Sharia contains laws that serve two purposes as far as capital punishment is concerned: 

establishment of justice and prevention of arbitrary execution. Sharia puts conditions to awake in the human soul motives other than deterrence, moral motives to achieve relative justice. Accordingly, Sharia gives the Commander of the Muslims, the ruler or law according to our traditions, the permission to make decisions according to what conforms to the status quo and the circumstances of society.

We talked about the immaturity of Islamic society these days and the suspension of the death penalty to establish justice. If the death penalty is executed in society while it is immature, this will be an outrageous injustice.

Then, we are against all capital punishment stipulated in the laws applied in the Arab, Islamic , Western and Eastern countries, because they do not achieve the Divine Justice that seeks preservation of life by all possible means. 

In addition, trials concerning the death penalty are seldom fair, and when justice becomes rare, the judgment must be immediately suspended to avoid injustice.



2. The mere fact that the dignity of the human being is a concern of all cultures and religions should give the impetus to discuss the matter.


3. The International Society for Human Rights 

..calls upon the UN Human Rights Commission: to call upon the Organisation of Islamic Conferences to actively promote the non-application of stoning as a form of punishment in their member states. Others say a better understanding of Sharia would reduce the concerns of non-Muslims. 


4. Roman Loimeier, Professor of religion, Beyreuth UniversityGermany

In all schools of Islamic law, the only possibility to punish someone with the "hadd"  punishment for adultery would be if both partners confess.  If they do not confess, the procedural law says you have to bring four witnesses who have seen the act committed. Next, these four witnesses have to be men, and  good citizens - honest and accepted members of  the community.  Thirdly, all the witnesses have to give identical statements.  [So] it is almost impossible to carry out a "hadd" [severe] punishment unless there's a confession [by the adulterers].

The problem is in countries like Sudanwhere Sharia is applied, these [laws of procedure] ruling the application of the Sharia are not applied.  So what you [get] is a perversion of the application of the Sharia. Many [Islamic scholars] conclude that the real Sharia as applied in Sudan or Afghanistan is not the real Sharia - but a perversion of it.


5. John VollProfessor of Islamic History at Georgetown University in Washington, D-C, Associate director of Muslim-Christian Understanding in Washington

Besides following these judicial procedures, experts  say there are other recourses for reducing penalties. 
If [the governor] were doing it in the more traditional sense, he would go to a Sharia scholar and ask for a "fatwa", a legal advisory opinion.  He would ask the scholar [if] it would it be justified to suspend the amputation of the hand of this person because of the extenuating circumstances at the current moment, and the scholar might say yes, it's possible.  The governor would then say in light of this non-binding opinion, I will then suspend the implementation of the amputation, but give an equivalent punishment.


6. Farid Esack, Muslim Theologian, Cape TownSouth Africa

The Sharia is meant as a path for reaching a harmonious society.  When the Sharia gets elevated to being a sacred entity by itself, this is the antithesis of what Islam stands for - which is the absolute supremacy, or sacredness of God - and only God is sacredreligion is not sacred - Sharia is not sacred, the path to reach God is not sacred.  And so Muslims then have to  see what are the underlying principles of the law that God enunciated for Muslims at a particular time, and what are the objectives of the law.  It is the objectives of the law which we should seek to fulfill and not the letter of  the law particularly when there is no homogenous community where everyone has an equal level of religiosity [belief] and commitment to that particular faith, or where everyone has an identical understanding of what following Sharia entails.


 7. Mohammed Saliha native of Sudan, a professor at the Institute for Social Studies in the Hague
(Netherlands):


Sharia also has an indirect impact on non-Muslims. [When] you accept Sharia as the [legal] code, 
you accept the whole notion of citizenship that comes with it.  You divide society in two: the people of the [Koran] and the non-Muslims.  Here you create a hierarchy of citizens: Christians, Jews, and traditional believers.  The hierarchy is applied to power - if you are Muslim you are more likely to have more legal rights under Sharia law than non-Muslims-so the implications [of Sharia] go beyond the criminal code.


8. Noah FeldmanLaw professor at Harvard University 

To many, the word “Shariah” conjures horrors of hands cut off, adulterers stoned and women oppressed. In fact, for most of its history, Islamic law offered the most liberal and humane legal principles available anywhere in the world. Today, when we invoke the harsh punishments prescribed by Shariah for a handful of offenses, we rarely acknowledge the high standards of proof necessary for their implementation.

Before an adultery conviction can typically be obtained, for example, the accused must confess four times or four adult male witnesses of good character must testify that they directly observed the sex act. 

It sometimes seems as if we need Shariah as Westerners have long needed Islam: as a canvas on which to project our ideas of the horrible, and as a foil to make us look good.

Today, 66 percent of Egyptians, 60 percent of Pakistanis and 54 percent of Jordanians say that Shariah should be the only source of legislation in their countries. Islamist political parties, like those associated with the transnational Muslim Brotherhood, make the adoption of Shariah the most prominent plank in their political platforms. And the message resonates. 

9. A.Miller, contributer, The Brussels Journal: 

Ironically, if Galloway had have used the word “Koran,” while suggesting that “the mere reading” of it might inspire the kind of hate on display in Undercover Mosque, he himself might well have stepped over the line into the realm of hate crime. Galloway, though, a friend of Islamic extremists everywhere, is perfectly happy to use this kind ofNewspeak. And plenty of mainstream British and European politicians are only slightly less craven.Dutch parliamentarian, and head of the Party for Freedom (PVV), Geert Wilders is one of those who is not. As you can imagine, this gets him into all kinds of trouble, from media trashing to death threats.
This week he was back in court in Amsterdam to answer charges of violating articles 137c and 137d of the Dutch Penal Code, which prohibit “inciting hatred” or “discrimination” against anyone because of their religion, race, gender, etc., and carry up to a two-year prison sentence.
Wilders has repeated ad nauseam that he has nothing against Muslims, but only against the ideology of Islam, and in the pre-hearing, once again reiterated that he was not “out to offend people. I have nothing against Muslims. I have a problem with Islam and the Islamization of our country because Islam is at odds with freedom.”
The transformation of Amsterdam from the world’s most liberal city to one where gays are now frequently attacked, is just one of the aspects of “Islamization” that Wilders has a problem with. And for this, the court apparently has a problem with Wilders. 
The summons also documents Wilders statements against Islam, including his call to ban the Koran, which he has described as a “fascist book.” Then there’s the summons’ scene-by-scene breakdown of Wilders’ 17-minute movie Fitna. Similar to Undercover Mosque, Fitna is largely a compilation of documentary footage – again of hate preachers inciting violence against non-Muslims, Jews, and so on, as well as scenes of actual violence committed by Islamic militants and terrorists, and extracts of the Koran.
The suras shown in writing throughout the film are those such as surah 8, verse 60 (“Prepare for them whatever force and cavalry ye are able of gathering, to strike terror, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies, of Allah and your enemies”) which are used by Islamic militants to justify, and indeed to inspire, terrorist attacks and other atrocities.
This is obvious to anyone who has spent even a few hours perusing extremist Muslim chat rooms (including those run by and for those living in the West), has the slightest knowledge of al-Qaeda or other terrorist networks, or has read the Hamas charter, which so neatly sums up the Jihadist’s raison d’etre in article eight:
“Allah is its target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes.”
The Dutch authorities, however, like those of other European states, appear almost to have sided with the terrorists and extremists – not merely over non-Muslims, but over moderate and reformists Muslims as well. As Salim Mansur said in the Toronto Sun“the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has conceded space to the Islamists by accommodating, in practical terms, their demand for acceptance of Shariah (Islamic law) within secular society.”

10. Dr. Robert D. Crane, The Global Justice Movement: 

On May 7th, 2003, the National Association of Evangelicals convened a summit conference of forty leaders, representing 43,000 congregations, to address the issue of whether they should focus their efforts on countering or converting Muslims. Their conclusion was that the mission of proselytizing must have top priority and that this necessarily conflicts with the radical efforts to brand Islam and the Prophet Muhammad as inherently evil and violent.

As Protestant extremism declines in the aftermath of the successful war in Iraq, the negative assessment of Islam as a religion has been taken up by neo-conservative leaders within the Catholic Church. One of the most articulate of such leaders appears to be Michael Novak, one of the top intellectuals in America’s first policy think-tank, The American Enterprise Institute.

This represents an entirely new approach to Islam, because it is based not on generalizing from the action of extremist Muslims but on denial of what centuries ago the greatest Muslim scholars, all imprisoned for their beliefs, considered to be the three basic fundamentals of Islam as a religion. The newest strategy apparently is to single out these essential truths of Islam, deny that they exist, and assert that their absence constitutes the Islamic threat. This sophisticated strategy may be more effective over the long run than are the simplistic claims of Pat Robertson and Franklyn Graham that Muslims are bandits.

The challenge to American Muslims, especially after 9/11, is to explain the difference between Islam as a religion and Muslims as its supposed practitioners.

Equally important is the challenge for Muslims to put their own house in order by marginalizing the extremism that can give rise to violence and by taking advantage of the post-Iraq environment to end the poverty and oppression that feed such extremism.