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Showing posts with label Extremism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Extremism. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 16, 2010

Maktab & Madressahs: Elementary & Higher Religious Schools in Islamic Societies

Donald Malcolm Reid, Updated by Syed Rizwan Zamir

As the nineteenth century opened, Islamic societies had highly developed educational institutions—elementary Qurān schools (Ar., kuttāb or maktab) and higher religious schools called madrasahs. Less formal education was available from ūfī lodges (khanqah), literary circles at princely courts, private tutors, private study circles (alaqah), and apprenticeships in state bureaus and craftsmen's shops.

This article discusses five phases of the development of educational institutions in the Islamic world since 1800. In phase one, Islamic schools were unaffected by the West. In phase two, reforming Muslim rulers set up Western-style military and professional schools. In phase three, colonial rulers subordinated schools to their own imperial interests. This phase also saw major reforms of traditional institutions in which the process of transmission of religious knowledge was formalized and standardized according to Western institutional models. More importantly, the transformations that took place during this period have proven to be conclusive for later eras. In phase four, newly independent states unified their school systems and rapidly expanded all levels of schooling. Phase five saw, as an aftermath of various sociopolitical developments, a renewed interest in educational reforms along Islamic lines.
The chronology of these phases varied from place to place, and some countries bypassed a phase or two. The Ottomans entered phase two as early as 1773 by opening a naval engineering school; isolated North Yemen and Saudi Arabia had not yet entered it in 1950. The colonial rule of phase three began before 1800 in the Dutch East Indies and India, but reached Syria and Iraq only after World War I. North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan skipped the colonial phase. Turkey and Iran won the independence of phase four in the 1920s without having been fully colonized, while the emirates of the lower Gulf did not begin phase four until the British left in 1971.
The most significant aspect of premodern madrasah education was its informal character, as seen in the lack of central administrative control and the absence of strictly defined categories of religious and nonreligious subjects. This is despite the fact that madrasahs helped construct, shape, and homogenize religious authority and knowledge by encoding standard Islamic religious texts and canon collections. Their informal character was, however, replaced by a much more standardized religious education in the colonial period and onward.
Qurān schools stressed memorization of the Qurān, reading, and writing. Memorization did not always mean comprehension, particularly for non-Arab Muslims. Teachers taught in homes, mosques, or shops, receiving their pay from pupils’ fees or waqfs (pious endowments).
Advanced schooling in mosques went back to the seventh century, but the formal madrasah—an endowed residential college stressing the sharīah—took shape only in the eleventh century. The Niāmīyah in Baghdad was a renowned prototype. In common usage, distinctions between mosque schools and madrasahs disappeared. Subjects more directly tied to the revelation were stressed: Qurānic exegesis, adīth, jurisprudence, theology, Arabic grammar, and logic. Others such as arithmetic, astronomy, medicine, philosophy, and poetry, which were not strictly religious, were also taught in many madrasahs. There were no formal admissions or graduation ceremonies, no grade levels, written examinations, grades, classrooms, desks, or school diplomas. It was not the institution but the teacher with whom one studied and from whom one received a certificate (ijāzah) that determined a student's authority in the subject.
Al-Azhar in Cairo, the Süleymaniye in Istanbul, Qarawīyīn in Fez, the Zaytūnah in Tunis, and various mosque-madrasahs in Mecca, Medina, and Damascus stood out in the Sunnī world of 1800. For the Shīah, the madrasahs of Najaf (Iraq) were foremost, with others in Isfahan and other Iranian cities.
Defeat in wars with Russia and Napoleon's invasion of Egypt (1798) forced Muslim rulers to reform their armies and military support services along Western lines.
Three related phenomena (which persist into the early twenty-first century) accompanied the new schools: (importing Western educators, dispatching students to study in the West (small missions first left Egypt in 1809, Iran in 1811, and Istanbul in 1827), and putting new printing presses to work publishing translated Western textbooks. Importantly, all these developments bypassed any consultation or collaboration with the existing madrasah institutions.

Wednesday, September 8, 2010

Shariah, Globalism, Media, Muslim Extremists, Stoning-Beheading-Flogging, Hate Crime & Christian Extremism

1. Dr Hamdy MuradProfessor of Sharia at Al-Balqa Applied UniversityJordan

The regulations of Sharia can only be applied in a mature, Islamic educated society that is familiar with the respective regulations, morals and laws. This is a principal issue. These regulations should not be applied in an Islamic society that is not mature or in which the reasons of righteousness are absent.

We do not deny what is stated in the Koran or what is agreed upon by all scholars. The conditions stated for executing the death penalty are very balanced and show an outstanding miracle and accurate balance. On the one hand, they demand that the regulations be applied and on the other they prevent them from being applied, according to regulations and conditions. Accordingly, the purpose is not only deterrence, but also establishing justice, considering the spiritual, social, moral and educational aspects. There is a group of factors that interact with the soul. Absolutely, the death penalty must be imposed on the murderer. Yet, when we explore the conditions and details, we find that Islam is much more merciful than all the laws applied on earth. Avoiding punishment in secular laws results in injustice, while the conditions and regulations set to avert the death penalty signifies the utmost Islamic Justice.

Sharia contains laws that serve two purposes as far as capital punishment is concerned: 

establishment of justice and prevention of arbitrary execution. Sharia puts conditions to awake in the human soul motives other than deterrence, moral motives to achieve relative justice. Accordingly, Sharia gives the Commander of the Muslims, the ruler or law according to our traditions, the permission to make decisions according to what conforms to the status quo and the circumstances of society.

We talked about the immaturity of Islamic society these days and the suspension of the death penalty to establish justice. If the death penalty is executed in society while it is immature, this will be an outrageous injustice.

Then, we are against all capital punishment stipulated in the laws applied in the Arab, Islamic , Western and Eastern countries, because they do not achieve the Divine Justice that seeks preservation of life by all possible means. 

In addition, trials concerning the death penalty are seldom fair, and when justice becomes rare, the judgment must be immediately suspended to avoid injustice.



2. The mere fact that the dignity of the human being is a concern of all cultures and religions should give the impetus to discuss the matter.


3. The International Society for Human Rights 

..calls upon the UN Human Rights Commission: to call upon the Organisation of Islamic Conferences to actively promote the non-application of stoning as a form of punishment in their member states. Others say a better understanding of Sharia would reduce the concerns of non-Muslims. 


4. Roman Loimeier, Professor of religion, Beyreuth UniversityGermany

In all schools of Islamic law, the only possibility to punish someone with the "hadd"  punishment for adultery would be if both partners confess.  If they do not confess, the procedural law says you have to bring four witnesses who have seen the act committed. Next, these four witnesses have to be men, and  good citizens - honest and accepted members of  the community.  Thirdly, all the witnesses have to give identical statements.  [So] it is almost impossible to carry out a "hadd" [severe] punishment unless there's a confession [by the adulterers].

The problem is in countries like Sudanwhere Sharia is applied, these [laws of procedure] ruling the application of the Sharia are not applied.  So what you [get] is a perversion of the application of the Sharia. Many [Islamic scholars] conclude that the real Sharia as applied in Sudan or Afghanistan is not the real Sharia - but a perversion of it.


5. John VollProfessor of Islamic History at Georgetown University in Washington, D-C, Associate director of Muslim-Christian Understanding in Washington

Besides following these judicial procedures, experts  say there are other recourses for reducing penalties. 
If [the governor] were doing it in the more traditional sense, he would go to a Sharia scholar and ask for a "fatwa", a legal advisory opinion.  He would ask the scholar [if] it would it be justified to suspend the amputation of the hand of this person because of the extenuating circumstances at the current moment, and the scholar might say yes, it's possible.  The governor would then say in light of this non-binding opinion, I will then suspend the implementation of the amputation, but give an equivalent punishment.


6. Farid Esack, Muslim Theologian, Cape TownSouth Africa

The Sharia is meant as a path for reaching a harmonious society.  When the Sharia gets elevated to being a sacred entity by itself, this is the antithesis of what Islam stands for - which is the absolute supremacy, or sacredness of God - and only God is sacredreligion is not sacred - Sharia is not sacred, the path to reach God is not sacred.  And so Muslims then have to  see what are the underlying principles of the law that God enunciated for Muslims at a particular time, and what are the objectives of the law.  It is the objectives of the law which we should seek to fulfill and not the letter of  the law particularly when there is no homogenous community where everyone has an equal level of religiosity [belief] and commitment to that particular faith, or where everyone has an identical understanding of what following Sharia entails.


 7. Mohammed Saliha native of Sudan, a professor at the Institute for Social Studies in the Hague
(Netherlands):


Sharia also has an indirect impact on non-Muslims. [When] you accept Sharia as the [legal] code, 
you accept the whole notion of citizenship that comes with it.  You divide society in two: the people of the [Koran] and the non-Muslims.  Here you create a hierarchy of citizens: Christians, Jews, and traditional believers.  The hierarchy is applied to power - if you are Muslim you are more likely to have more legal rights under Sharia law than non-Muslims-so the implications [of Sharia] go beyond the criminal code.


8. Noah FeldmanLaw professor at Harvard University 

To many, the word “Shariah” conjures horrors of hands cut off, adulterers stoned and women oppressed. In fact, for most of its history, Islamic law offered the most liberal and humane legal principles available anywhere in the world. Today, when we invoke the harsh punishments prescribed by Shariah for a handful of offenses, we rarely acknowledge the high standards of proof necessary for their implementation.

Before an adultery conviction can typically be obtained, for example, the accused must confess four times or four adult male witnesses of good character must testify that they directly observed the sex act. 

It sometimes seems as if we need Shariah as Westerners have long needed Islam: as a canvas on which to project our ideas of the horrible, and as a foil to make us look good.

Today, 66 percent of Egyptians, 60 percent of Pakistanis and 54 percent of Jordanians say that Shariah should be the only source of legislation in their countries. Islamist political parties, like those associated with the transnational Muslim Brotherhood, make the adoption of Shariah the most prominent plank in their political platforms. And the message resonates. 

9. A.Miller, contributer, The Brussels Journal: 

Ironically, if Galloway had have used the word “Koran,” while suggesting that “the mere reading” of it might inspire the kind of hate on display in Undercover Mosque, he himself might well have stepped over the line into the realm of hate crime. Galloway, though, a friend of Islamic extremists everywhere, is perfectly happy to use this kind ofNewspeak. And plenty of mainstream British and European politicians are only slightly less craven.Dutch parliamentarian, and head of the Party for Freedom (PVV), Geert Wilders is one of those who is not. As you can imagine, this gets him into all kinds of trouble, from media trashing to death threats.
This week he was back in court in Amsterdam to answer charges of violating articles 137c and 137d of the Dutch Penal Code, which prohibit “inciting hatred” or “discrimination” against anyone because of their religion, race, gender, etc., and carry up to a two-year prison sentence.
Wilders has repeated ad nauseam that he has nothing against Muslims, but only against the ideology of Islam, and in the pre-hearing, once again reiterated that he was not “out to offend people. I have nothing against Muslims. I have a problem with Islam and the Islamization of our country because Islam is at odds with freedom.”
The transformation of Amsterdam from the world’s most liberal city to one where gays are now frequently attacked, is just one of the aspects of “Islamization” that Wilders has a problem with. And for this, the court apparently has a problem with Wilders. 
The summons also documents Wilders statements against Islam, including his call to ban the Koran, which he has described as a “fascist book.” Then there’s the summons’ scene-by-scene breakdown of Wilders’ 17-minute movie Fitna. Similar to Undercover Mosque, Fitna is largely a compilation of documentary footage – again of hate preachers inciting violence against non-Muslims, Jews, and so on, as well as scenes of actual violence committed by Islamic militants and terrorists, and extracts of the Koran.
The suras shown in writing throughout the film are those such as surah 8, verse 60 (“Prepare for them whatever force and cavalry ye are able of gathering, to strike terror, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies, of Allah and your enemies”) which are used by Islamic militants to justify, and indeed to inspire, terrorist attacks and other atrocities.
This is obvious to anyone who has spent even a few hours perusing extremist Muslim chat rooms (including those run by and for those living in the West), has the slightest knowledge of al-Qaeda or other terrorist networks, or has read the Hamas charter, which so neatly sums up the Jihadist’s raison d’etre in article eight:
“Allah is its target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes.”
The Dutch authorities, however, like those of other European states, appear almost to have sided with the terrorists and extremists – not merely over non-Muslims, but over moderate and reformists Muslims as well. As Salim Mansur said in the Toronto Sun“the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has conceded space to the Islamists by accommodating, in practical terms, their demand for acceptance of Shariah (Islamic law) within secular society.”

10. Dr. Robert D. Crane, The Global Justice Movement: 

On May 7th, 2003, the National Association of Evangelicals convened a summit conference of forty leaders, representing 43,000 congregations, to address the issue of whether they should focus their efforts on countering or converting Muslims. Their conclusion was that the mission of proselytizing must have top priority and that this necessarily conflicts with the radical efforts to brand Islam and the Prophet Muhammad as inherently evil and violent.

As Protestant extremism declines in the aftermath of the successful war in Iraq, the negative assessment of Islam as a religion has been taken up by neo-conservative leaders within the Catholic Church. One of the most articulate of such leaders appears to be Michael Novak, one of the top intellectuals in America’s first policy think-tank, The American Enterprise Institute.

This represents an entirely new approach to Islam, because it is based not on generalizing from the action of extremist Muslims but on denial of what centuries ago the greatest Muslim scholars, all imprisoned for their beliefs, considered to be the three basic fundamentals of Islam as a religion. The newest strategy apparently is to single out these essential truths of Islam, deny that they exist, and assert that their absence constitutes the Islamic threat. This sophisticated strategy may be more effective over the long run than are the simplistic claims of Pat Robertson and Franklyn Graham that Muslims are bandits.

The challenge to American Muslims, especially after 9/11, is to explain the difference between Islam as a religion and Muslims as its supposed practitioners.

Equally important is the challenge for Muslims to put their own house in order by marginalizing the extremism that can give rise to violence and by taking advantage of the post-Iraq environment to end the poverty and oppression that feed such extremism.

Friday, April 30, 2010

What is the context of Muslim Extremism?

Abdul Hakim Murad

The extreme has broadened, and the middle ground, giving way, is everywhere dislocated and confused. 

And this enfeeblement of the middle ground is in turn accelerated by the opprobrium which the extremists bring not simply upon themselves, but upon committed Muslims everywhere. For here, as elsewhere, the preferences of the media work firmly against us. ..when a fringe Islamic group bombs Swedish tourists in Cairo, the muck is instantly spread over 'militant Muslims' everywhere.  

If it is ever to prosper, the 'Islamic revival' must be made to see that it is in crisis, and that its mental resources are proving insufficient to meet contemporary needs. The response to this must be grounded in an act of collective muhasaba, of self-examination, in terms that transcend the ideologised neo-Islam of the revivalists, and return to a more classical and indigenously Muslim dialectic.  

It is true that we frequently hear the Quranic verse which states that "God does not change the condition of a people until they change the condition of their own selves." But never, it seems, is this principle intelligently grasped. Nothing could be more hazardous, however, than to measure such moral reform against the yardstick of the fiqh without giving concern to whether the virtues gained have been acquired through conformity (a relatively simple task), or proceed spontaneously from a genuine realignment of the soul.

And as the Blessed Prophet never tired of reminding us, there is little value in outward conformity to the rules unless this conformity is mirrored and engendered by an authentically righteous disposition of the heart. 'No-one shall enter the Garden by his works,' as he expressed it.

Meanwhile, the profoundly judgemental and works - oriented tenor of modern revivalist Islam (we must shun the problematic buzz-word 'fundamentalism'), fixated on visible manifestations of morality, has failed to address the underlying question of what revelation is for. For it is theological nonsense to suggest that God's final concern is with our ability to conform to a complex set of rules. His concern is rather that we should be restored, through our labours and His grace, to that state of purity and equilibrium with which we were born. 

To make this point, the Holy Quran deploys a striking metaphor. In Sura Ibrahim, verses 24 to 26, we read:  

Have you not seen how God coineth a likeness: a goodly word like a goodly tree, the root whereof is set firm, its branch in the heaven? It bringeth forth its fruit at every time, by the leave of its Lord. Thus doth God coin likenesses for men, that perhaps they may reflect. And the likeness of an evil word is that of an evil tree that hath been torn up by the root from upon the earth, possessed of no stability. 

According to the scholars of tafsir (exegesis), the reference here is to the 'words' (kalima) of faith and unfaith. The former is illustrated as a natural growth, whose florescence of moral and intellectual achievement is nourished by firm roots, which in turn denote the basis of faith: the quality of the proofs one has received, and the certainty and sound awareness of God which alone signify that one is firmly grounded in the reality of existence. The fruits thus yielded - the palpable benefits of the religious life - are permanent ('at every time'), and are not man's own accomplishment, for they only come 'by the leave of its Lord'. Thus is the sound life of faith. The contrast is then drawn with the only alternative: kufr, which is not grounded in reality but in illusion, and is hence 'possessed of no stability'.

It is against this criterion that we must judge the quality of contemporary 'activist' styles of faith. Is the young 'ultra', with his intense rage which can sometimes render him liable to nervous disorders, and his fixation on a relatively narrow range of issues and concerns, really firmly rooted, and fruitful, in the sense described by this Quranic image?  This ephemerality of extremist activism should be as suspicious as its content. Authentic Muslim faith is simply not supposed to be this fragile; as the Qur'an says, its root is meant to be 'set firm'.

The Islamic world is passing through a most devastating period of transition. A history of economic and scientific change is being squeezed into a couple of generations. For instance, only thirty-five years ago the capital of Saudi Arabia was a cluster of mud huts, as it had been for thousands of years. Today's Riyadh is a hi-tech megacity of glass towers, Coke machines, and gliding Cadillacs. This is an extreme case, but to some extent the dislocations of modernity are common to every Muslim society, excepting, perhaps, a handful of the most remote tribal peoples.  

Such a transition period, with its centrifugal forces which allow nothing to remain constant, makes human beings very insecure. They look around for something to hold onto, that will give them an identity. In our case, that something is usually Islam. And because they are being propelled into it by this psychic sense of insecurity, rather than by the more normal processes of conversion and faith, they lack some of the natural religious virtues, which are acquired by contact with a continuous tradition, and can never be learnt from a book.  

One easily visualises how this works. A young Arab, part of an oversized family, competing for scarce jobs, unable to marry because he is poor, perhaps a migrant to a rapidly expanding city, feels like a man lost in a desert without signposts. One morning he picks up a copy of Sayyid Qutb from a newsstand, and is 'born-again' on the spot. This is what he needed: instant certainty, a framework in which to interpret the landscape before him, to resolve the problems and tensions of his life, and, even more deliciously, a way of feeling superior and in control. He joins a group, and, anxious to retain his newfound certainty, accepts the usual proposition that all the other groups are mistaken.  

This, of course, is not how Muslim religious conversion is supposed to work. It is meant to be a process of intellectual maturation, triggered by the presence of a very holy person or place. Tawba, in its traditional form, yields an outlook of joy, contentment, and a deep affection for others. The modern type of tawba, however, born of insecurity, often makes Muslims narrow, intolerant, and exclusivist. Even more noticeably, it produces people whose faith is, despite its apparent intensity, liable to vanish as suddenly as it came. Deprived of real nourishment, the activist's soul can only grow hungry and emaciated, until at last it dies.  



Read more by Abdul Hakim Murad: 

On The Essence of Islam's Theology of Gender



ABDUL HAKIM MURAD

Born Timothy J. Winter in 1960, Abdal Hakim studied at the prestigious Westminster School inLondonUK and later at the University of Cambridge, where he graduated with first class honours in Arabic in 1983. He then lived in Cairo for three years, studying Islam under traditional teachers at Al-Azhar, one of the oldest universities in the world. He went on to reside for three years in Jeddah, where he administered a commercial translation office and maintained close contact with Habib Ahmad Mashhur al-Haddad and other ulama from HadramautYemen.

In 1989, Sheikh Abdal Hakim returned to England and spent two years at the University of Londonlearning Turkish and Farsi. Since 1992 he has been a doctoral student at Oxford University, specializing in the religious life of the early Ottoman Empire. In 1996, he was appointed University Lecturer in Islamic Studies at the University of Cambridge.

Sheikh Abdal Hakim is the translator of a number of works, including two volumes from Imam al-Ghazali Ihya Ulum al-Din. He gives durus and halaqas from time to time and taught the works of Imam al-Ghazali at the Winter 1995 Deen Intensive Program in New HavenCT. He appears frequently on BBC Radio and writes occasionally for a number of publications including The Independent and Q-News International, Britain's premier Muslim Magazine.

He lives with his wife and children in CambridgeUK.


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