The Muslims Struggle for Islam is also Their Struggle to Preserve Their Cultures

Excerpts from a paper by Dr. Ejaz Akram

[Do not cite or reproduce from the following paper without permission of author]

A Definition of Culture

[Hence, in the light of the above ] I would like to present a definition of culture as “a realm of shared beliefs, ideas and symbols”. Inasmuch as culture is a medium between human beings, it also plays the part of binding individuals together, or that which binds humans with other humans. Non-material and higher aspects of cultures promote unity and cohesiveness in and across cultures, while the material side of culture such as geography and ethnicity often cause fragmentation.

Religion  AND Culture: Traditional & Modern Culture: Proximity & Distance from God

Traditional cultures are by and large religious cultures. 

It may be possible to find anti-religious or agnostic people and even small scale intellectual movements in the traditional world, but ultimate legitimacy of things in traditional cultures has always come from religion. Modern culture and cultures are exceptional in a sense that for the first time in human history they have managed to produce a secular ‘culture’ whose referent is not God and whose legitimacy comes not from proximity but distance from God. In a worldview that either denies the existence of God or relegates references to God as a backward form of human consciousness, it becomes possible to assert that all human behavior is socially and culturally determined, and culture alone is upheld to be the producer of the values it lives by.

Culture as a medium

Traditionally only religion has had the right to know cultures, inform the medium of culture of religious truth and want to see cultures as a reflection of itself. Only in modern times culture has equipped itself to look at not only itself but also religion. In that sense, it would be safe to assert that religious humans have a say on matters of culture while culture lacked the ability to do the same. This is because culture is a medium, it will carry in itself whatever one puts in it and people will only transmit across generations that which is of value, that what brings happiness, felicity, peace, and that which avoids pain, suffering and anguish. For the traditional man, it is religion that accomplishes the above and for the modern man, it is often the absence of religion that supposedly accomplishes that.

Religions views culture as its repository

Religion views culture as its repository. The ultimate source of religion is God, and God is out of the confines of time and space. The humans on the other hand are bound by time and space. The law, ethics, morality and rituals of religion are meant for those that live in the human abode. God is above humans and God’s knowledge seeks to inform the way people live in their earthly abode. In this sense, religion seeks to inform culture with perennial principles that are a key to leading a good life. 

Religions thus leave their imprints on human cultures. 

History of humanity is also a history of religions. There is nothing in the world that has nothing to do with religion. Religions have always sought to guide humanity towards cultivating cultures that uphold ‘thou must not kill’ and ‘thou must not deceive’. World religions always seek to regulate human behavior so that there is peace among humans.

In religious worldview, the marriage of religion and culture would be like the marriage of Heavens and Earth or the marriage of man and woman. The former representing the absolute and active principle while the latter is the reflection of the former as a receptacle:

“A traditional civilization, such as that of Islam, is dominated by a Divine Norm, by a ‘presiding Idea’ which leaves its profoundest imprint upon its earthly receptacles; yet each receptacle is given the freedom to develop its own innate possibilities within the tradition into which it is integrated and hence to give birth to a particular ‘world’ or ‘zone’ within the general matrix of the tradition in question”.[15]

Traditional religion views traditional cultures as its repository. 


Modern religion (different types of fundamentalisms, especially revisionist Islam in its salafi form) are uncomfortable with the concept of culture because in its worldview religion should be pure and pristine while culture is seen as a polluting agent that has corrupted religion. 

In the Islamic tradition, Muslim scholars have viewed traditional cultures with the terminology of ‘urf.[16] Ibn Khaldun, the famous 14^th century philosopher calls the study of societies (and their cultures) ilm al umran.[17] In the Islamic philosophic tradition, the relationship between traditional religion and traditional cultures was a symbiotic one in which ‘urf was informally considered by many doctors of law as a legitimate source of Islamic law.

The word ‘urf in Arabic means human customs, conventions, practices and social habits.[18] It comes from the same root word as irfan or ilm al ma’arifa which implies higher and Gnostic knowledge. 

Muslims' struggle for Islam is also Their Struggle to Preserve their Cultures

All religions are first and foremost traditions. There is nothing intrinsically modern about religion. Like the institution of family, religion is also a traditional institution. Out of all living religions, Muslims are still arguably closest to their religion and constitute the last remaining frontier that modernism vies to engulf and dissolve. 

The Muslims’ struggle for Islam is also their struggle to preserve their cultures as receptacles of Divine words.

According to S. H. Nasr:

“Islamic culture displays an undeniable unity which is the result of the spirit and form of the Islamic revelation and ultimately of Divine Unity itself. In the same way that the whole created order is the theophanic reflection of the One in the mirror of multiplicity, so are the various ‘faces’ of Islamic culture so many human echoes of the one Message which is itself beyond the human and which alone bestows upon the activity of a human collectivity the purposes and values which make it worthy of being called a culture in conformity with the noble destiny of man”.[28]

Read full paper: http://baytunur.blogspot.com/2009/08/religion-culture-contours-of-debate.html

Read more by and about Dr. Ejaz Akram http://baytunur.blogspot.com/2010/06/modernism-secularism-evolution-culture.html

Impact of Religion on Economic Growth: USAID Bureau Policy and Program Coordination 2004 Report

Peter Timmer, Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI Pakistan http://www.dai.com/pakistan/ ) and Center for Global Development

Donald McClelland, U.S. Agency for International Development

The long-standing debate over the impact of religion on economic growth particularly the current debate over the impact of Islamic thought on the economic prospects of Muslim countries—parallels similar debates over the impact of Catholicism, Hinduism, and other religions. These debates have not had much impact on development practice, partly because of their inconclusive nature.

The issue addressed in this paper is whether Islam, as the “religion of practice” in a wide range of countries, poses serious problems for economic growth or whether the undeniably poor economic performance of many Muslim countries stems from sources unrelated to Islamic theology and practice.

Recognizing the tension between progressive and moderate practitioners of Islam and their fundamentalist challengers—a tension that often spills into the political arena—the paper concludes that most Muslim countries face very difficult governance issues that have impeded rapid economic growth

Why do Muslims tend to be relatively poor? The facts are undisputed: Muslims make up 19 percent of the world’s population but earn only 6 percent of its income. The issue is whether there are any causal relationships between religion and economic development. Many scholars suggest that religion is typically not a problem, pointing out that Islamic beliefs and values that appear inimical to growth (e.g., the ban on interest and restrictions on speculation) are routinely circumvented. The corporation is now an acceptable and popular organizational form in most Muslim countries. Insurance contracts are legally enforceable. Banks are integral components in every Muslim country’s economy.

And contracts involving interest payments are commonplace, although payments are sometimes disguised as commissions or fees.

Others believe there are deeper problems. Characterizing an Islamic economic system—

“Islamic economics”— as a middle ground between capitalism and socialism, they cite the Koran’s overriding emphasis on the need for social justice; rejection of severe economic disparities; condemnation of economic exploitation, usury, and dishonesty; call on well-to-do individuals to use part of their wealth to help the poor and support various charitable endeavors; and repeated expressions of concern for those least capable of defending themselves against poverty. Despite the Koran’s emphases, proponents of Islamic economics argue that it can effectively promote both economic development and social welfare in predominantly Muslim countries.

It seems clear that the economic institutions Islamic law prevented—corporate law, banks, stock markets, modern firms, insurance—are all integral parts of most economies of the Muslim world. As a result, economic policy reforms needed to accelerate economic growth in the Muslim world could be adopted without having to confront Islam as a religion.

Although Islam harbors elements inimical to economic productivity and efficiency, these have not formed an absolute barrier to economic growth. In fact, Noland’s recent analysis (2003) of India, Malaysia, and Ghana provides empirical evidence that there is no consistent, systematic relationship between economic growth and the share of a country’s population practicing Islam. He concludes that the impact of Islam on short-run economic performance is as diverse as Islam itself.

The Muslim world is extensive and diverse, comprising 48 countries where at least 50 percent of the population is Muslim. It extends from West Africa (Morocco and Mauritania) to East Asia (Indonesia). The larger Islamic world includes several countries with a significant Muslim minority. India is the most prominent of these countries with a Muslim minority of over 125 million people (12 percent of the population). Others include Kazakhstan, with almost 8 million Muslims (47 percent of the population), and Uganda, with almost 4 million Muslims (16 percent of the population). In France, nearly 6 million people are Muslim (about 10 percent of the French population).

The top five Muslim-country recipients of USAID economic assistance over the five-year period 1997–2001 were Egypt, Jordan, West Bank/Gaza, Indonesia, and Bangladesh. In 2002, Pakistan and Turkey were among the top five recipients; Indonesia and Bangladesh were not, though they were still among the top 10. The top five recipients of USAID assistance per capita in 2002 included Albania, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, Jordan, and West Bank/Gaza.

Khan (1999) zeros in on the crux of the issue, asking how would one  know what an Islamic economy looks like if there has never been one. He draws a sharp distinction between Islamic countries as political entities, of which there are many, several with very deep historical roots, and Islamic economies, where historical experience is thin. The examples of the latter usually cited—Afghanistan under the Taliban, Iran under the Revolutionary Council of Ayatollah Khomeini, and Sudan under Hassan al-Turabi—certainly give cause for concern that Islamism can be a vehicle for economic growth and improved standards of living. According to MSI (2002), the reason seems deeply rooted in the nature of Islam:

First, economics is, at best, of secondary importance to Islamists. It does not feature prominently in their political agenda, or in the books, articles and pamphlets that emanate from Islamist circles. Islamist thinkers, politicians, and activists are clearly far more concerned with matters of morality, ethics, and piety than with economic questions. Some even express contempt for economics. As Ayatollah Khomeini once remarked when pressed to address economic issues, “the revolution is about Islam, not about the price of melons.” Islamism is driven first by culture (the search for a “moral order,” consistent with God’s will for mankind, as revealed in the Koran) and, second, by politics (the quest for controlling the levers of power that will make it possible to

establish that moral order). Economic concerns are far less central to Islamist thinking and strategizing; they come well after cultural and political objectives.

To understand the impact of Islam on economic growth in Muslim countries, it is necessary to understand this challenge from Islamism and the links between economics and politics (economic governance). Although it is probably fair to say that Islam per se is not a significant impediment to improved economic performance in any Muslim country (Annex 1), it can be a contributing factor.

According to Jabber (2002), poor economic performance in so many of these countries is one of the three basic causes of widespread alienation of the populations of Muslim countries from their governments. This alienation in turn supports fundamental Islamism, which is the main challenge to political authority in Muslim countries. And Islamism’s political challenge— often using violent means—undermines the basic economic environment needed to improve investment returns and to stimulate higher standards of living.

From this perspective, analyses of what went wrong economically in the Muslim world have focused on immediate or proximate causes, rather than deep and fundamental causes. Abed’s review (2003) for the IMF of the Middle East and North Africa region, for example, provides an extensive litany of policy failures and poor governance as the reasons for their “unfulfilled promise.” Islam is not mentioned even once as a factor associated with these problems.

Similarly, a USAID review of lessons learned from USAID and other donor experience in providing economic assistance to selected Islamic countries never mentions Islam as a contributing factor to the success or failure of the ten specific projects reviewed. Moreover, neither the IMF nor the USAID review provides guidance on how to fix poor policies or improve governance, when both may well be held hostage to the political challenge from fundamental Islamists. Specific actions for possible support by USAID are identified at the conclusion of this report.

Read full report: http://www.cgdev.org/doc/commentary/timmer_USAIDw.pdf

PETER TIMMER:  In addition to his faculty positions in three schools at Harvard, Timmer has also held professorships at Cornell and Stanford. In 1992, he received the Bintang Jasa Utama (Highest Merit Star) from the Republic of Indonesia for his contributions to food security. He served as the chief outside advisor to USAID for developing their strategy on growth and agriculture for the Natsios Report (Foreign Assistance in the National Interest), and he was one of the key advisors for the World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development. He currently serves as an advisor to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation on agricultural development and food security issues.

Some Statistics as Annex in this report: 

Annex 1. Countries in the Muslim World1

Middle East and North Africa (18)

Algeria

Bahrain

Egypt

Iran

Iraq

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Libya

Morocco

Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tunisia

United Arab Emirates

West Bank/Gaza

Yemen

Europe and

Eurasia (7)

Albania

Azerbaijan

Kyrgyzstan

Tajikistan

Turkey

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

South Asia (4)

Afghanistan

Bangladesh

Maldives

Pakistan

East Asia and

the Pacific (3)

Brunei

Indonesia

Malaysia

Africa (16)

Burkina Faso

Comoros

Chad

Djibouti

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Gambia

Guinea

Mali

Mauritania

Niger

Nigeria

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Somalia

Sudan

Agrarian Economies (21)                              Oil Producers (22)                            Neither (9)

Ethiopia                                                               Albania                                                Turkey

Burkina Faso                                                      Algeria                                                 Uzbekistan

Niger                                                                     Azerbaijan                                          Kyrgyzstan

Guinea                                                                  Bahrain                                                Maldives

Mali                                                                       Brunei                                                   West Bank/Gaza

Chad                                                                     Egypt                                                     Lebanon

Tajikistan                                                            Iran                                                       Jordan

The Gambia                                                        Iraq                                                       Morocco

Eritrea                                                                  Kuwait                                                Djibouti

Comoros                                                              Libya

Senegal                                                                 Malaysia

Somalia                                                                Oman

Afghanistan                                                       Qatar

Nigeria                                                                Nigeria

Sudan                                                                   Sudan

Sierra Leone                                                       Saudi Arabia

Bangladesh                                                         Syria

Yemen                                                                 Yemen

Indonesia                                                            Indonesia

Mauritania                                                         Tunisia

Pakistan                                                               Turkmenistan

United Arab Emirates1

1. Member of OPEC (10)

2. Both agrarian and oil producing

Note: Agrarian economies are Muslim countries where at least 50 percent of employment is in the agriculture sector; oil producers are Muslimcountries that are members of OPEC and/or Muslim countries categorized in the exporters of crude oil or oil and petroleum products.

Source: CIA Factbook, 2002.

Agriculture         Industry               Services

Middle East and North Africa

Algeria                                                 8.8                          59.7                        31.5

Bahrain

Egypt                                                    16.7                        33.1                        50.2

Iran                                                        17.7                        33.3                        49.0

Iraq

Jordan                                                   2.2                          24.8                        73.0

Kuwait

Lebanon                                               11.9                        22.0                        66.1

Libya

Morocco                                               13.5                        32.2                        54.3

Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

Syria                                                     22.8                        28.7                        48.5

Tunisia                                                 12.3                        28.8                        58.9

United Arab Emirates

West Bank/Gaza                               7.8                          26.6                        65.6

Yemen                                                  14.6                        48.0                        37.4

Unweighted Average                           12.8                        33.7                        53.4

Europe and Eurasia

Albania                                                50.7                        22.7                        26.5

Azerbaijan                                          17.0                        45.3                        37.7

Kyrgyzstan                                        36.8                        29.2                        34.0

Tajikistan                                            29.5                        29.7                        40.8

Turkey                                                  15.4                        25.3                        59.3

Turkmenistan                                    28.1

Uzbekistan                                         34.4                        23.1                        42.5

Unweighted Average                           30.6                        29.2                        40.1

South Asia

Afghanistan

Bangladesh                                         24.6                        24.4                        51.0

Maldives

Pakistan                                               26.7                        23.1                        50.2

Unweighted Average                           25.6                        23.8                        50.6

Asia and the Pacific

Brunei

Indonesia                                             17.0                        47.1                        35.9

Malaysia                                              8.7                          51.2                        40.1

Unweighted Average                           12.8                        49.2                        38.0

Africa

Burkina Faso                                      39.7                        19.1                        41.2

Comoros                                              40.9                        11.9                        47.2

Chad                                                     39.2                        13.8                        47.0

Djibouti                                                3.7                          14.2                        82.1

Eritrea                                                  15.2                        22.9                        61.9

Ethiopia                                               52.3                        11.1                        36.6

Gambia                                                33.2                        12.3                        54.5

Guinea                                                  23.6                        36.5                        39.9

Mali                                                       41.2                        21.3                        37.5

Mauritania                                         21.3                        29.1                        49.6

Niger                                                     37.8                        17.8                        44.4

Nigeria                                                 29.5                        46.0                        24.5

Senegal                                                 18.1                        26.9                        55.0

Sierra Leone                                       47.3                        33.6                        19.0

Somalia

Sudan                                                   41.1                        18.5                        40.4

Unweighted Average                           32.3                        22.3                        45.4