Islam as a Political Tool: The Zia Era of Islamization of Pakistan

Mubarka Ahmed

The military regime under Zia-ul-Haq entered the political arena in 1977 as a “caretaker ninety-day government whose “sole aim was “to organize free and fair elections. The “directionless drama eventually spanned over the course of eleven years, having been granted a legal license to persist by the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

It soon experienced a remarkable shift in policies, with religious reform becoming a top priority before long. A. K. Brohi, General Zia’s Law and Religious Affairs Advisor, claimed in less than a year after Zia’s take over that the “main concern of the military coup had been “to put the country on the Islamic system.

The process of Islamisation started almost immediately, and soon emerged strongly in the shape of legal amendments.

Just five days after coming to power, new Martial Law regulations with strict Quranic penalties for a series of crimes were announced. Zia persistently advocated his support for complete Nizam-e-Mustafa (Order of the Prophet) in Pakistan. Over the years, innumerable promises over a starkly broad range of issues to Islamize the legal and social dynamics of the country were made, but much of it remained un-implemented . This led to an increasing sense of superficiality associated with the selective process of Islamisation, appearing to be a matter more concerned with state convenience, impression-building, and political tactics as opposed to genuine motives to find the right place for Islam within Pakistan’s political structures. As Ali rightly states, “Whatever Islamisation Zia had been enforcing was more to consolidate his own personal power than to establish a genuine Islamic order. 

In the wake of election-postponement, Zia unveiled a four-tiered priority agenda with Islamisation at the top of the hierarchy . This eleven-year rule dedicated to Islamisation, saw in its very first year the making of a parallel legal system that looked to the Quran and Sunnah for precedents, the performance of which was limited to ‘law-finding’ and not ‘law-making’. 

Various other legal amendments followed in the name of Islam. The controversial Hudood Ordinances were duly approved the next year. The Law of Evidence (Qanoon-e-Shahadat) was then amended to severely affect the rights of women, followed by the compulsory deduction of Zakat, and other such changes. It was the first time in the history of Pakistan that strict Islamic penalties, as in operation in Saudi Arab, were being legalised. Modifications in Pakistan’s economic system through the establishment of Islamic Banking, abolition of bank interest (riba), mandatory collection of zakat (social welfare tax), introduction of Islamic bank tax (ushr) and establishment of various institutions to study Islamic economics were all contemplated as well. Educational reforms were mandated by setting up the International Islamic University, Shariah Training Institute, and various ulema training institutions. Social reforms were also introduced under the new Nizam-e-Mustafa; re-enforcement of the pre-existing bans on gambling and alcohol, stricter measures to encourage the observance of purdah (veil) and so forth. 

Religion also served as the prime justification for the military regime. It allowed the gap between the ‘Islamic’ way of governance and that specified by Western standards to be widened substantially; the un-Islamic nature of democratic forms of governance thus came under question. “The rhetoric of Islam and the inculcation of an Islamic identity have been deployed by the rulers of the state to justify arbitrary and undemocratic practices. Zia made sporadic comments on the need for a strong presidential form of government, it being more in line with the “thinking and psyche of Muslims, since they “believed in one God, one Prophet, and one Book, and their mentality is that they should be ruled by one man. He contended that true Islamic values envisioned a strong presidential system as opposed to the formerly established parliamentary one – another example of the use of Islam to entrench personal power. 

Amidst innumerable cases of non-implementation, those implemented resulted in acute social, political upheavals. Resentment followed from various quarters of society, particularly women and the Shia community. State-led Islamisation was in effect being reduced to ‘Sunni’ Islamisation which undermined the universalist claims of the entire process.

Academic scholarship of the time clearly saw the weaknesses and superficiality associated with these reforms. ‘Political noise’ regarding Islamisation was at its peak, but the unimplemented reforms showed a lack of genuine interest - Zia’s reform agenda had more force in words and vision than in practical reality.

On most occasions, it merely re-enforced Bhutto’s pre-existing reforms (bans on gambling, alcohol etc.) or made cosmetic changes to existing policies, e.g. zakat collection schemes. Most crucially though, many of the policies were simply left unimplemented; e.g. textbook reform, the ban on riba and so forth. Where there was implementation, it constituted a very minor change in existing policies, e.g. general educational reform and introduction of ‘Islamic Banks’. Kennedy cites these examples to illustrate the superficiality associated with Zia’s process of Islamisation, and the severe fickleness behind the entire procedure . Joshi reiterates, “Islamic regulations came to have but one source - the volition of Zia. 

The expediency of the propagation of this Islamisation process with reference to the international arena was a highly important factor for Zia too. Saudi concern in Pakistani politics, their support of adherents and advocates of Saudi Islam (Jamaat-i-Islami) and their vested interests in facilitating socio-religious dominance in Pakistan were key factors acting as catalysts for the Islamisation process. The Saudi interest in promoting their breed of Islam all over the Muslim world has been a constant feature of Pakistani politics, and was at its peak under Zia. Zia forcefully supported Saudi causes in Pakistan. The Afghan war proved another catalyst for this support, “The Afghan war in the 1980s once again raised the prospects of communism reaching the shores of Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf was quick to respond. Generous funding infiltrated the borders of Pakistan, to support and propel Islamic activities, thereby strengthening Pakistan’s Islamic identity. 

“The fount of Zia’s Islamic ideology came from Maulana Maudoodi and his Jamaat-i-Islami party. Zia was heavily reliant upon the Jamaat until his power became entrenched; the Jamaat on the other hand was interested in having an ideological stronghold in Pakistani politics that would outlive Zia’s temporary government. This resulted in a proximity that would heavily influence Zia’s policies and politics; an appeased JI meant a stronger power-foothold. This is, for many academics, one of the key explanations for Zia’s interest and keenness towards religion and religious reform. Joshi opines that, “It is obvious that in the priorities of the Jamaat, Islam was the most decisive consideration. Since Zia’s veneer of Islam fitted in with the Jamaat fanaticism, the two-some forged an alliance of collusive concurrence with a view to holding Pakistan to ransom.

The question put to the citizenry of Pakistan for the 1984 referendum is indicative of the manipulative use of religion for political gain. The people were asked a single question, the crux of which was whether they supported the Islamisation process and “the Islamic ideology of Pakistan. A yes vote would automatically serve as a vote of confidence for electing Zia as the president of Pakistan for the next five years. The manipulation was evident in the referendum; for emphasis, the yes column of the ballot was printed in green (symbolic of Islam) and the rest in white. 

Thus Zia’s era saw the use of religion has a highly charged entity, loaded with possibilities to justify an unconstitutional regime, entrench power, build external alliances and win domestic support. Islam, originally a matter of individual choice and preference, ultimately evolved into a prime governance tool subject to the heaviest forms of manipulation.

CONCLUSION: 

One way of understanding the reasons behind such use and abuse of religion under both regimes is to remember that Pakistan has always operated on an ‘Islamic mandate’, even under its most secular regimes. 

Bhutto for instance, was “arguably Pakistan’s most secular leader, but even before he reverted to the politicisation of religion for personal gain, the central PPP credo was, “Islam is our ideology, socialism our economy, and democracy our politics. 

Pakistan’s leaders have thus always reckoned the expediency of using Islamic rhetoric to support changes in policies, but what differentiates the two aforementioned regimes in this regard has been the ugly abuse of Islam and religious sentiments to further personal and politically charged agendas. Kennedy has argued that these legal and social changes brought under the name of Islam did not do much damage in practical terms; but many authors have debated that these “islamisation measures have created an environment of fanaticism and extremism in Pakistan . A hostile atmosphere, foul with fanaticism, has emerged and strengthened over time, finding its roots in the events that unfolded under the Bhutto and Zia regimes and the atmosphere of intolerance created therein.

Additionally, legal structures have suffered drastically, most primarily because of the ambiguity that has been created by the absence one standard source of law – the sources now being the Quran, Sunnah and the Constitution, all operating under a wider ambit of ‘Islam’ as the primary source. This ambiguity has facilitated the abuse of religion that has taken place in Pakistan, and has wreaked havoc in the legal system. Religion, by its very essence, allows for numerous interpretations, and thus as a non-standardized source of law, has given rise to drastic vagueness. 

The fact that there has been no ‘popular movement’ questioning the wisdom behind these laws is evidence that people are queasy questioning religion. Surely this is not something that places Pakistanis society alone but the way Islam has come to be viewed by many as unarguable. Even attempts to rationalize religion in light of modern day society have often been stomped down by fanatics as heretical advance to foil orthodox religion. Reform is slow, as society is uneasy about challenging anything validated under the guise of Islam. 

Read full article: http://www.chowk.com/articles/islam-as-a-political-weapon-in-pakistan-Mubarka-Ahmad.htm

Islam as a Political Tool: The Bhutto Era of Islamization of Pakistan

Mubarka Ahmad

The process of Islamising the state of Pakistan started as early as 1949. It was then that Pakistan’s career as a theocracy began in theory; with Liaquat Ali Khan’s (Prime Minister, 1947-51) move to secure the adoption of the Objectives Resolution by the Constituent Assembly, thereby substituting divine sovereignty for the sovereignty of the people. However, despite the fact that successive constitutions declared Pakistan an Islamic Republic, the use of Islam in politics remained chiefly rhetorical, to the great displeasure of religious organizations who championed the desirability, if not the necessity, of making Pakistan a truly Islamic state. 

President Ayub Khan (1958-69) showed clear modernistic tendencies; yet retained a modest complacency towards a degree of pre-existing Islamic ideology legitimized by the Pakistan movement, but took it no further . The trend of predominantly religion-free politics continued with Yahya Khan (1969-71), who similarly showed little sympathy for the religious parties. Till the rise of Pakistan People’s Party in the 1970s, the political stance regarding religious parties had been unsympathetic, as evidenced by the imprisonment and original announcement of death sentence of Maulana Maududi, head of the Jamaat-i-Islami in response to the Punjab disturbances in 1953.

It was only after the fall of Dhaka that the role of religion in politics was drastically altered. Power was handed over to Bhutto, who had won a clear victory in West Pakistan in the 1971 elections. Much to the consternation of the people and despite his liberal-progressive leanings, it was Bhutto who signed the risky merger between religion and politics soon after. It was with his coming to power that Islam became a catalyst for furthering political motives.

BHUTTO’S ERA:

The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) had won the 1971 elections on a heavily leftist map for governance; entrenched as it was in socialist ideals and thereby enjoying massive support. However, it was not long before the tide shifted. “It was not until Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power at the end of 1971 following the secession of East Pakistan that any elements of Islamic ideology began to appear in Pakistan’s substantive foreign policy. Islam came to the forefront of all policy and law-making decisions, and, ultimately, a vast host of issues, economic , policy-related etc. were increasingly dressed in Islamic colours. Religion soon after became the official legitimising strategy for all political manoeuvres. 

The PPP’s view of the role that religion would play in Pakistani politics was an issue controversial from its very inception. Bhutto introduced the term ‘Islamic Socialism’, but was never truly able to define its tenets . The ambiguity was ultimately used to an advantage when the political expediency of religion became evident. “Devotionalism", however, had never originally been part of the PPP’s strategy to rally the masses for support, and Bhutto had never been seen to portray himself as an observant Muslim; the rightly guided leader of a Muslim nation . For the most part, religion remained distinct from the politics of substantive policy-making. The PPP’s governance policy never encompassed a theocratic Pakistan, merely a socialist state based on principles of Islamic justice – whilst retaining Islam as a personal matter for the individuals of the state. This further supported PPP’s leftist stance as originally envisioned. This strongly leftist and somewhat secularist stance, however, was soon drastically altered. 

What were the reasons, then, for the shift in policy; why did the PPP feel the need to resort to religious rhetoric and appeal to religious justifications as key guiding factors for policy and law-making? “If most of Pakistan’s leaders were not particularly enthusiastic about Islamisation, why did so many take the initiative to bring it about, or at least acquiesce in it, when the populace has never once opted to vote for religious parties committed to the creation of an Islamic Pakistan? The attempt is to understand why and how religion began to carry this value as a political tool for governance.

Amongst other factors, the events of 1971 are of crucial importance in this regard. Bhutto was handed a country that had only recently been split into two. International politics and external alliances were in complete disarray. Having lost its only significant ethnic and religious minority, the Hindus, Pakistan drew closer to its neighbours in the East . The Governments of Saudi Arab and the United Arab Emirates supported “all kinds of Islamist activities in Pakistan to save it from falling in the clutches of socialism, and negating its thus-far latent Islamic identity. Bhutto acknowledged this interest, and realised the advantages of building alliances with these oil-rich states. The most powerful alliance Bhutto would seek with the Gulf would be an ideological one; Islamic brotherhood. 

At the level of public diplomacy, the Islamic Summit in Lahore was seen as the right political move to further this growing bond. Socialism, the initial guide to policy- and law-making was put aside and international politics began rapidly leading to a change in priorities. The crucial aspects of this dependency were, “economic assistance… temporary migration and employment of hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis in the Gulf States. Bhutto’s commitment to the Gulf-alliances, and the value he attached to them became manifest when the emergence of Pakistan’s nuclear program was accompanied by deeply Islamic rhetoric, alarming many. It was one of the first in a series of moves to create an ‘Islamic identity’ for Pakistan. 

These events relating to external affairs and foreign policy amalgamated to create an environment that led Bhutto to realize the latent power in religious rhetoric, and the crucial role that Islam would play for economic advantages and initiating alliances with these hugely wealthy Gulf monarchies. As Delvoie elucidates, the need for “strengthening ties with these countries… to diversify Pakistan’s sources of financial and political support at a time when he thought the country had become overly dependant on the United States and precisely when the Gulf states were beginning to deploy the wealth accumulated as a result of spectacular increases in the price of oil had hit the PPP hard. 

However, a far more dangerous shift was soon to follow: the use of Islamic rhetoric for internal politics – rallying the masses, seeking legitimacy for controversial policies, and Islam as a means to ensure popular support. The political use of Islam was now evident to the PPP, not just for international alliances and fiscal benefits, but more so for the growing internal threats to power. By the late 1970s, the PPP was facing a substantial threat from the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA); an umbrella organization of nine opposition parties that was to contest the upcoming March elections. The primary uniting feature of the resistance was a general dislike for Bhutto’s politics, but given varying and sometimes even contradictory party-agendas (Asghar Khan’s secularism, Khan Abdul Wali Khan’s socialism, and Maududi’s assertive Islamism), an agreement on the necessity of a positive role of Islam in policy-making became the ‘official’ party-agenda for the PNA . This signified the emergence of the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) as one of the key players in Pakistani politics. 

As a result, the legal structures began to be heavily influenced by this process of Islamisation, if simply as a means to prove the Government’s loyalty to Islam by infiltrating it into the Constitution. Subsequent amendments to the Constitution followed; making Islam the state religion and setting pre-requisites for the head of state to be Muslim. In a frenzy to break the momentum of the PNA-led movement, numerous Islamisation measures erupted. Shariat laws were introduced; gambling, horse racing, and alcohol were banned. The PPP manifesto was duly amended, making Friday the weekly holiday, introducing Quranic studies as mandatory for all students, establishing Ulema (clerical) academies and so forth . A new newspaper “Musawat" was founded to propagate Islamic justification for the PPP rule. These steps were of course accompanied with the appropriate rhetoric seeking to allow Bhutto to gain electoral support from the more religiously inclined quarters of society. ‘Socialism’ was accordingly replaced in party literature for “Musawat-i-Mohammadi"(‘Equality of Mohammad’), i.e. Islamic egalitarianism. These moves established the PPP’s dedication to the cause of Islam, which became Bhutto’s most powerful defence to fight the PNA in their own battlefield. One of Bhutto’s last desperate bids to buy off religious parties agitating for his overthrow with U.S. backing was to declare the Ahmadiyya Community non-Muslim in 1974. In 1976, he controversially appointed General Zia-ul-Haq the Chief of Army Staff in another move to appease the JI, of whom Zia was a close compatriot. Ironically, upon the advice and persuasion of Mian Tufail, the militant leader of JI, Zia overthrew Bhutto in 1977 . Later expressing regret for his political tactics, a resigned Bhutto claimed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, “I appointed a Chief of Army Staff belonging to Jaamat-i-Islami, and the result is before us all. 

Islam had thus evolved into the most predominant political factor to facilitate in both external and internal scenarios, by the end of Bhutto’s regime and as a result thereof. Although his insistence upon the role of Islam in Pakistani politics during his final days in power could not save his fading popularity, it did serve to reinforce the centrality of Islam for the military regime that followed. The dangerous alliance between military might and religious pressure thus found its seeds in Bhutto’s policy shifts, only to find renewed force under the approaching military rule. 

Read full article: http://www.chowk.com/articles/islam-as-a-political-weapon-in-pakistan-Mubarka-Ahmad.htm

Uzbekistan Mosque

Architectural detail, Uzbekistan

'Whereever the eyes looks, it sees beauty'

http://www.flickr.com/photos/jaxxon/16916401/

Western Muslim Responses to Western Modernity: T. J. Winters (b.1960, U.K.)

"Despite its origins in 7th century Arabia, it [Islam] works everywhere, and this is itself a sign of its miraculous and divine origin [...] Islam, once we have become familiar with it, and settled into it comfortably, is the most suitable faith for the British. Its values are our values. Its moderate, undemonstrative style of piety, still waters running deep; its insistence on modesty and a certain reserve, and its insistence on common sense and on pragmatism, combine to furnish the most natural and easy religious option for our people [...] Islam is the true consanguinity of believers in the One True God, the common bond of those who seek to remain focussed on the divine Source of our being in this diffuse, ignorant and tragic age. But it is generous and inclusive. It allows us to celebrate our particularity, the genius of our heritage; within, rather than in tension with, the greater and more lasting fellowship of faith."

Dr. T. J. Winter, known now as Abdal-Hakim Murad, is a British convert to Islam. He received his masters degree from the Cambridge University at England and later studied at Al Azhar. He was a research fellow at the Oxford University. Currently, he is a lecturer of Theology at Cambridge University. Among his works is the translation of al Bayhaqi's "Seventy-Seven Branches of Faith" into English. He has also authored many articles about Islam and Muslims.

His 8-tape lecture series called Understanding Islam received much acclamation from both Muslims and non-Muslims. The lectures were given to a primarily non-Muslims audience and is considered unparalleled for its objectivity and research. It covers the following topics: The Five Pillars of Islam; Sunnah, Shariah, Sectarianism and Ijtihad; Scriptural Links Between Judaism, Christianity and Islam; Muslim-Christian Views of One Another; Muslim Theology and Islamic Mysticism; and The Muslim Influence on Europe and the West.

Balancing the Zahir and the Batin


Islam is a balance between the zahir and the batin, i.e., the form and the spirit, the external and the internal, the expressed and the hidden, the husk and the kernel, the body and the soul. It is such a balance that are meant to be manifested in a believer. When that happens, he or she is a beauty.

This essential quality of a believer is excellently elaborated by Winter in two of his best articles: Seeing With Both Eyes and The Sunna As Primordiality. He concludes one of these articles with the following soothing words that give us hope and re-assurance in a world that is seemingly full of evil and oppression:

"Those of us who have lived far from nature, and far from beauty, and far from the saints, often have anger, and darkness, and confusion in our hearts. But this is not the Sunna [the examples of Prophet Muhammad]. The sunna is about detachment, about the confidence that however seemingly black the situation of the world, however great the oppression, no leaf falls without the will of Allah. Ultimately, all is well. The cosmos, and history, are in good hands.

"That was the confidence of Rasulullah (s.w.s.) [the Prophet]. It has to be our confidence as well. There is too much depression among us, which leads either to demoralisation and immorality, or to panic, and meaningless, ugly forms of extremism, which have nothing to do with the serenity and beauty to which the Ka'ba summons us. But Islam commands wisdom, and balance. It is the middle way. And for us, whatever our situation, it is always available, and can always be put into practice. We are the fortunate umma in today's world. Fortunate, because unlike Westerners, we are still centred on beauty. In other words, we still know what we are, and what we are called to be. " Dr. T. J. Winter

Read more: http://www.welcome-back.org/profile/winter.shtml

On Modernity:



http://tv.muxlim.com/video/Wrc6Av15If4/Shaykh-Abdul-Hakim-Murad-TJ-Winter-Islam-and-Modernity/

On Sufsim/Tasawwuf  by T.J. Winters: http://baytunur.blogspot.com/2010/04/what-is-tasawwuf-or-sufism.html

Western Muslim Response to Western Modernity: Tariq Ramadan (b.1962, Switzerland)

Le thème de la modération dans la pratique traverse la littérature islamique depuis l’origine. Dans le Coran et dans les traditions prophétiques qui l’accompagnent, les musulmanes et les musulmans sont appelés à faire preuve de modération dans tous les domaines de la pratique. « Dieu veut pour vous la facilité et non la difficulté » rappelle le Coran et Muhammad (PBSL) affirme « Facilitez les choses, ne les rendez point difficiles » et il donnait lui-même l’exemple en choisissant les allégements (comme de ne pas jeûner le ramadan en voyage) pour que les fidèles ne tombent pas dans l’excès. C’est ainsi que, dès l’origine, la majorité des savants ont compris la formule coranique qualifiant les musulmans de « la communauté du juste milieu ». Très tôt, il est apparu deux tendances dans la nature de la pratique : ceux qui appliquaient les enseignements à la lettre sans tenir compte du contexte ou des allégements (ahl al-‘azîma) et ceux (ahl ar-rukhas) qui tenaient compte de ces derniers et de la flexibilité de la pratique selon le contexte social et l’époque et en situation de besoin (hâja) et/ou de nécessité (darûra). L’immense majorité des savants (ulamâ) et des musulmans à travers le monde ou en Occident (quelles que soient les traditions chiites ou sunnites et les écoles de droit) promeuvent et suivent la voie de la modération et de la flexibilité dans la pratique. Ils restent stricts sur les principes fondamentaux mais proposent des adaptations selon l’environnement et l’époque. Sans doute est-ce déjà à ce premier niveau qu’opère un premier malentendu sur la notion de modération. Dans les sociétés occidentales où la pratique et la visibilité quotidiennes de la religion sont quasiment absentes (même aux Etats-Unis où la référence religieuse est plus présente), le fait de parler de prière, de jeûne, d’obligations morales et vestimentaires liées à la religion semble déjà presque excessif. Les musulmans modérés seraient donc ceux qui ne manifestent pas de distinction vestimentaire, qui boivent de l’alcool ou qui pratiquent leur religion « comme nous la nôtre », c’est-à-dire plus vraiment ou en tout cas de façon invisible. Les histoires et les références ne sont pas les mêmes et la notion de modération est toujours à considérer de l’intérieur de chaque univers de référence.

On peut en Occident décider que les musulmans modérés sont ceux qui sont invisibles, ou ceux qui nous ressemblent, ou encore ceux qui acceptent les termes de leur domination. De tels raisonnements et conclusions ne permettront pourtant pas de comprendre les dynamiques qui traversent les sociétés majoritairement musulmanes et les communautés établies en Occident. Or celles-ci sont multiples et complexes : il existe un débat strictement religieux (en terme de philosophie du droit islamique et de ses fondements) sur la notion de modération (wasatiyya) qu’il est important d’appréhender dans toute son envergure. Il permet de mieux comprendre les enjeux des débats intracommunautaires entre les différentes tendances et les dispositions exclusivistes et parfois dogmatiques au sein des courants apparemment les plus ouverts. Cette approche permet d’aborder les questions politiques avec moins de parti pris et/ou de naïveté. Une fois condamnés les groupes extrémistes violents qui tuent les civils et les innocents, il convient de contextualiser les positions politiques afin de ne pas simplifier la grille d’analyse avec des conclusions du type : les « modérés » sont ceux qui nous soutiennent ou nous ressemblent et les autres sont des fondamentalistes ou des islamistes extrémistes. Ces considérations sont idéologiques et entretiennent des confusions qui ne permettent pas d’appréhender la nature des enjeux d’abord essentiellement politiques et économiques. C’est bien ce que cache la rhétorique du « conflit des civilisations » qui oppose en termes religieux et culturels des entités construites qui ne traduisent en rien les aspirations de justice et de liberté qui s’expriment dans les deux univers de référence. C’est en ce sens que la voix de ceux qui défendent avec force la modération religieuse (qui représente nous l’avons dit l’immense majorité des musulmans) doit se faire entendre de façon plus « radicale » afin de traduire en des termes adéquats la similarité des valeurs éthiques mais aussi la nature des rapports de force politiques et économiques profondément dissymétriques. Il importe que ces voix se fassent entendre et expriment que la modération religieuse, d’une part, peut se marier avec la radicalité d’un discours politique, non violent et démocrate, opposé à la domination, à l’exploitation et à l’oppression sous toutes ses formes.

Qui sont les musulmans modérés ?

Read more: http://www.tariqramadan.com/spip.php?article11020

On the Swiss Minaret issue: http://baytunur.blogspot.com/2010/03/tariq-ramadan-swiss-minaret-issue.html

BIOGRAPHY: 

Tariq Ramadan, a Swiss citizen, is professor of contemporary Islamic studies at Oxford University. His most recent book is What I Believe published by OUP.

Ramadan has written more than 700 articles and some twenty books, including: To Be a European Muslim (2003); Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (2005); In the Footsteps of the Prophet: Lessons from the Life of Muhammad (2007); and Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation (2008). In addition, he has recorded at least 170 lectures, many of which have become popular among Muslim youths in Europe and elsewhere. Ramadan serves as an adviser on religious issues for the European Union.

Ramadan's maternal grandfather was Hasan al-Banna, who in 1928 founded the Muslim Brotherhood. Ramadan's father, Said Ramadan, led the Brotherhood throughout the 1950s and then was exiled from Egypt to Switzerland, where Tariq was born in September 1962.Tariq Ramadan grew up inGeneva, Switzerland. He was schooled in philosophy and French literature at the University of Geneva, and in Arabic and Islam at Al Azhar Islamic University in Cairo. 

Western Muslim Responses to Western Modernity: Rene Guenon (d.1951)

An introduction to Shaykh Abd Al Wahid Yahya - René Guénon

"René Guénon's role (was to be the) reviver of Tradition for the Western world."
Charles Upton < sacredweb.com >

"The civilization of the modern West appears in history a veritable anomaly: among all those which are known to us more or less completely, this civilization is the only one which has developed along purely material lines and this monstrous development, whose beginning coincindes with the so-called Renaissance, has been accompanied, as indeed it was fated to be, with a corresponding intellectual regress; we say corresponding and not equivalent, because here are two orders of things between which there can be no common measure. This regress has reached such a point that the Westerners of today no longer know what pure intellect is; in fact they do not even suspect that anything of the kind can exist;"

"Hence their disdain, not only for eastern civilization, but also for the Middle Ages of Europe, whose spirit escapes them scarcely less completely. 

How is the interest of a purely speculative knowledge to be brought home to people for whom intelligence is nothing but a means of acting on matter and turning it to practical ends, and for whom science, in their limited understanding of it, is above all important in so far as it may be applied to industrial purposes ? "  

Read more quotations from Rene Guenon: http://www.livingislam.org/gue_e.html#cw

His function is also to warn the people of religion, including Muslims, of the entanglements (fitna) of (post-) modernity, how it threatens to destroy the mentality even of some religious people as it did when modernity first emerged in the West, how it casts into doubt any absolute, metaphysical truth and how it influences the public at large.

A European intellectual from the first half of the 20th century, he had witnessed the tragic and seemingly unavoidable events of his times, not the least both World Wars. He confronted the ruling myths of this civilization, such as 'human progress', 'technical development towards a brighter future' and he penetrated some of the most important philosophical and religious traditions - when towards the middle of his life - he embraced Islam and travelled to Egypt where he lived until the end of his life as a well-respected Muslim author.

One of his main concerns was to produce an unsentimental analysis of Western ideological and religious development since the Renaissance, focusing on the degradation - as he saw it - of metaphysics, religion and philosophy and consequently of the mentality of the general populace.

He explained why the civilization of the West was built on false foundations, like a house built on sand: its positivism, its denial of true tradition and in consequence its metaphysical knowledge. He also showed the way to reform this situation by gaining access - through initiation - to the sacred and eternal treasure of timeless wisdom hidden beyond pseudo-sciences. His writings have inspired many engaged readers to search for truth and meaning in an otherwise meaningless world.

Another of his main concerns was to clear from the pure concept of Ultimate Reality everything that IT is not and to teach its pure doctrine, because IT can only be described in negative terms (of what IT is NOT ). His work is to remind us of the impossibility of having some rational concept of Ultimate Reality, except for the insight gained from intellectual intuition (the ma`rifa - intuitive knowledge of God) and the knowledge of revelation and prophetic tradition by following its teachings.

This introduction is not an adequate overview over this outstanding writer's work, who wrote no less than 26 books and conducted a numereous correspondance with many intellectuals of his time. Some of his main areas of focus are:

• A definition of tradition versus anti-tradition and sentimentalized religion
• a distinction between metaphysics versus philosophy and religion
• an exposition of metaphysics and the hierarchy of stages of being

• a clear doctrine of the Ultimate Reality, Allah, Almighty God
• a thorough examination of Western thought and mentality:
   - individualism, modernism, rationalism, quantification; slackening of doctrine
• a rigorous distinction between Intellect and reason
• an explanation of esoterism and its function in religion, of initiation
• an explanation of the science of symbolism

Read more: http://www.livingislam.org/trg.html

René Guénon or (November 15, 1886 – January 7, 1951) was a French author and intellectual who remains an influential figure in the domain of metaphysics, having written on topics ranging from metaphysics, sacred science and traditional studies to symbolism and initiation.

In his writings, he proposes either "to expose directly some aspects of Eastern metaphysical doctrines", these doctrines being defined by him as of "universal character" or "to adapt these same doctrines [for western readers] while keeping strictly faithful to their spirit";  he only endorsed the function of "handing down" those Eastern doctrines, while stating their "non-individual character".

His works, written and first published in French, have been translated into more than twenty languages.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/René_Guénon

Western Muslim Response to Western Modernity: Frithjof Schuon (d.1998)

Frithjof Schuon

In our time one has often heard it said that in order to fight against materialism—or materialist pseudo-idealism—a new ideology is needed, one capable of standing up to all seductions and assaults. Now, the need for an ideology or the wish to oppose one ideology to another is already an admission of weakness, and anything undertaken on this basis is false and doomed to defeat. What must be done is to oppose truth purely and simply to the false ideologies, that same truth that has always been and that we could never invent for the reason that it exists outside us and above us. The present-day world is obsessed with "dynamism" as if this constituted a "categorical imperative" and a universal remedy and as if dynamism had any meaning or positive efficacy outside truth.

It is obvious that here we are concerned, not with the quite external data with which experimental science can possibly provide us, but with realities which that science does not and indeed cannot handle and which are transmitted through quite a different channel, that of mythological and metaphysical symbolism. The symbolical language of the great traditions of mankind may indeed seem arduous and baffling to some minds, but it is nevertheless perfectly intelligible in the light of the orthodox commentaries; symbolism—this point must be stressed—is a real and rigorous science, and nothing can be more naive than to suppose that its apparent naivety springs from an immature and "prelogical" mentality. This science, which can properly be described as "sacred," quite plainly does not have to adjust itself to the modern experimental approach; the realm of revelation, of symbolism, of purse and direct intellection, stands in fact above both the physical and the psychological realms, and consequently, it lies beyond the scope of so-called scientific methods. If we feel we cannot accept the language of traditional symbolism because to us it seems fanciful and arbitrary, this shows we have not yet understood that language, and certainly not that we have advanced beyond it.

Tradition speaks to each man the language he can comprehend, provided he wishes to listen. The latter proviso is crucial, for tradition, let it be repeated, cannot "become bankrupt"; rather is it of the bankruptcy of man that one should speak, for it is he that has lost all intuition of the supernatural. It is man who has let himself be deceived by the discoveries and inventions of a falsely totalitarian science; that is to say, a science that does not recognize its own proper limits and for that same reason misses whatever lies beyond those limits.

Fascinated alike by scientific phenomena and by the erroneous conclusions he draws from the, man has ended by being submerged by his own creations; he will not realize that a traditional message is situated on quite a different plane or how much more real that plane is, and he allows himself to be dazzled all the more readily since scientism provides him with all the excuses he wants in order to justify his own attachment to the world of appearance and to his ego and his consequent flight from the presence of the Absolute.

People speak of a duty to make oneself useful to society, but they neglect to ask the question whether that society does or does not in itself possess the usefulness that a human society normally should exhibit, for if the individual must be useful to the collectivity, the latter for its part must be useful to the individual, and one must never lose sight of the fact that there exists no higher usefulness than that which envisages the final ends of man. By its divorce from traditional truth—as primarily perceivable in that "flowering forth" that is revelation—society forfeits its own justification, doubtless not in a perfunctorily animal sense, but in the human sense. This human quality implies that the collectivity, as such, cannot be the aim and purpose of the individual but that, on the contrary, it is the individual who, in his "solitary stand" before the Absolute and in the exercise of his supreme function, is the aim of purpose of collectivity. Man, whether he be conceived in the plural or the singular, or whether his function be direct or indirect, stands like "a fragment of absoluteness" and is made for the Absolute; he has no other choice before him. 

To cut off man from the Absolute and reduce him to a collective phenomenon is to deprive him of all right to existence qua man. If man deserves that so many efforts should be spent on his behalf, this cannot be simply because he exists, eats, and sleeps or because he likes what is pleasant and hates what is unpleasant, for the lowest of the animals are in similar case without being considered for this reason our equals and treated accordingly. To the objection that man is distinguished from the animal by his intelligence, we will answer that it is precisely this intellectual superiority that the social egalitarianism of the moderns fails to take into account, so much so that an argument that is not applied consistently to men cannot then be turned against the animals. To the objection that man is distinguished from animals by his "culture" we will answer that the completely profane and worldly "culture" in question is nothing more than a specifically dated pastime of the human animal; that is to say, this culture can be anything you please, while waiting for the human animal to suppress it altogether. The capacity for absoluteness that characterizes human intelligence is the only thing conferring on man a right of primacy; it is only this capacity that gives him the right to harness a horse to a cart. 

Pure intellect—or intuition and suprarational intelligence—can flower only in the framework of a traditional orthodoxy, by reason of the complementary and therefore necessary relationship between intellection and revelation.

The fundamental intention of every religion or wisdom is the following: first, discernment between the real and the unreal, and then concentration upon the real. One could also render this intention otherwise: truth and the way, prajnâ and upâya, doctrine and its corresponding method. One must know that the Absolute or the Infinite—whatever may be the names given it by respective traditions—is what gives sense to our existence, just as one must know that the essential content of life is the consciousness of this supreme reality, a fact that explains the part to be played by continual prayer; in a word we live to realize the Absolute. To realize the Absolute is to think of it, under one form or another as indicated by revelation and tradition, by a form such as the Japanese nembutsu or the Tibetan Om mani padme hum or the Hindu japa-yoga, not forgetting the Christian and Islamic invocations, such as the Jesus Prayer and the dhikr of the dervishes. Here one will find some very different modalities, not only as between one religion and another but also within the fold of each religion, as can be shown, for instance, by the difference between Jodo Shinshu and Zen. However this may be, it is only on the basis of a genuine spiritual life that we can envisage any kind of external action with a view to defending truth and spirituality in the world.

All the traditional doctrines agree in this: From a strictly spiritual point of view, though not necessarily from other much more relative and therefore less important points of view, mankind is becoming more and more corrupted; the ideas of "evolution," or "progress," and of a single "civilization" are in effect the most pernicious pseudo-dogmas the world has ever produced, for there is no newfound error that does not eagerly attach its own claims to the above beliefs.

Read full article: http://www.sacredweb.com/online_articles/sw1_schuon.html

Frithjof Schuon, (June 18, 1907 – May 5, 1998) was a native of Switzerland born to German parents in Basel, Switzerland. He is known as a philosopher, metaphysician and author of numerous books on religion and spirituality.

Schuon is recognized as an authority on philosophy, spirituality and religion, an exponent of the Religio Perennis, and one of the chief representatives of the Perennialist School. 

Criticism of the relativism of the modern academic world is one of the main aspects of Schuon's teachings. For Schuon the great revelations are the link between this absolute principle—God—and mankind. He wrote the main bulk of his metaphysical teachings in French.

In 1932 he met the celebrated Shaykh Ahmad al-Alawi and was initiated into his order.

Muslim Responses to Modernity: Darululoom Deoband (1867), MAO College Aligarh (1875) & Nadwatululama Lucknow (1894)

There were three major educational institutions established in the nineteenth century India to respond to the Muslim educational needs: Darul Ulum Deoband, Aligarh Muhammadan College, and Nadwatul Ulama, founded respectively in 1867, 1875 and 1894 by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Qasim Nanawtawi, and Shibli Nu’mani.

To Sheikh Muhammad Ikram, although Deoband and Nadwa both opposed Aligarh college policies, yet Nadwa was in many ways closer to Aligarh in its essential objectives of reform through education. Its revisionary approach to modernity developed in reaction to Aligarh’s experience in modern education.  [Dr. Muhammad Khalid Masud]

DARULULOOM DEOBAND: 1867

The chain of authenticity of the Darul Uloom starts with the great traditionist of India, Hazrat Imam Shah Waliyullah Dehlwi whose continuous chain of authenticity reaches back the Holy Prophet (Allah's peace and blessings be upon him!).

Shah Waliyullah's knowledge, taste and thought, through the medium of Shah Abdul Aziz, Shah Muhammad lshaq and then Shah Abdul Ghani, reached Hujjatul Islam (the Proof of Islam), Maulana Mohammad Qasim Nanautawi and Maulana Rasheed Ahmed Gangohi, who universalized it through this sacred institution, i.e., the Darul Uloom, Deoband.

This style of thought is not the result of mere rational deliberation or intellectual exercise; it is rather inspirational, the inspirational speciality of which Shah Waliyullah himself has expressed in his monumental work, Hujjatullahil Baligha.

Qasimul Uloom Maulana Mohammad Qasim Nanautavi (may Allah have mercy on him') was the pith of the sciences of Shah Waliyllah, Shah Abdul Aziz, Shah Mohammad lshaq and Shah Abdul Ghani and the quintessence of their religious discernment. Maulana Ubaydullah Sindhi used to say that the only ladder to Shah Waliyullah's philosophy is the Qasimi's philosophy without climbing which one cannot reach the Waliyullahian proofs adequately. So the sciences Shah Waliyullah presents in an aesthetic and apocalyptic color, Qasimul Uloom brings them out in an argumentative color. It is for this reason that in the Qasimul Uloom's knowledge there is knowledge with gnosis, expediency with command, the traditional with the rational, the rational with the perceptional, benefits with the law. The spiritual path (Tariqat) with the high road (Shari'at) of religion, consciousness of divine observation (Ehsan) with faith (Iman), defense of religion with its affirmation; that is, combining the sentiments of the grandeur of religion with religion. 

So if it were said, then it can be said that Deobandism is firstly Waliyullahism and secondly Qasimism, and that it is not merely the name of teaching and learning. And in view of the combination of the afore-said academic connections, it can be said that it is not merely a Madrasah but it is a Madrasah of though in the modern technical term, a school of thought.

Thus it becomes evident that Deobandism is neither a creed (Mazhab) nor a sect, terms by which its antagonists try to incite the masses against it. But it is a comprehensive picture and a complete edition of the tack of the Ahl-e-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah in which all he offshoots of the Ahl-e-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah are seen joined with their root. What a fine succinct sentence the Poet of the East, the late Dr. Sir Shaikh Mohammad lqbal had spoken about Deobandism! When someone asked him, "What thing is the Deobandi, a creed or a sect"? He replied: "It's neither a creed nor a sect; Deobandi is the name of every rationalist religious man".

The principle of religion, which is the Holy Book and the Sunnah, and respect for the religious personalities-jurisprudents (Fuqaha), traditionists (Muhaddethin), school doctors (Mutakallemin), professional commentators of the Quran (Mufasserin), Sufis, fundamentalists (Usuliyeen) and divine doctors (Ulma-e-Rabbaniyeen) -both have combined.

If there be no Sunnah, it will become a tack of heresies and innovations, and if AI-Jama'ah be missing, it will become a tack of self-opinion, freethinking and presumptuousness and the result of these two shortcomings is excess and deficiency.

http://www.darululoom-deoband.com/english/index.htm

MUHAMMADAN ANGLO ORIENTAL COLLEGE, ALIGARH: 1875

The University grew out of the work of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan who in the aftermath of the Indian War of Independence of 1857 felt that it was important for Muslims to gain modern education and become involved in the public life and Government Services in India at that time.

Raja Jai Kishan helped Sir Syed a lot in establishing this university.

The British decision to replace the use of the knowledge of Persian in the 1830s for Government employment and as the language of Courts of Law caused deep anxiety among Muslims of the sub-continent.

Sir Syed then clearly foresaw the imperative need for the Muslims to acquire proficiency in the English language and "Western Sciences" if the community were to maintain its social and political clout, particularly in Northern India. He began to prepare the road map for the formation of a Muslim University by starting various schools. In 1864, the Scientific Society of Aligarh was set up to disseminate Western works into native languages as a prelude to prepare the community to accept "Western Education".

Sir Sultan Mahommed Shah, The Aga Khan III has contributed greatly to Aligarh Muslim University in terms collecting funds and providing financial support.

In 1875, Sir Syed founded the Muhammadan Anglo Oriental College in Aligarh and patterned the college after Oxford and Cambridge universities that he had visited on a trip to England. His objective was to build a college in tune with the British education system but without compromising its Islamic values. 

It was one of the first purely residential educational institution set up either by the Government or the public in India. Over the years it gave rise to a new educated class of Muslims who were active in the political system of the British Raj, and who would serve as a catalyst for change among not only the Muslim population of India, but of the entire subcontinent. When Viceroy to India, Lord Curzon visited the College in 1901, he praised the work which was carried on by the College and called it of "sovereign importance".

By 1921(exact year 1920), the College was transformed into a university, and it was named Muslim University.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aligarh_Muslim_University

NADWATULULAMA, LUCKNOW: 1894

The Western influences, often forcibly imposed upon the world of Islam, created a schism between the spiritual and material domains of the community's life. The religion began to be looked down as something of a private concern having nothing to do with the affairs of the world.
The isolation of religion from practical life and its problems made the doctors of religion indifferent to the affairs of the contemporary world. And if they ever tried to interfere in these matters they were put to ridicule, because of their unfamiliarity with the modern thought and store of knowledge.


While the Islamic Millat was passing through these highly critical times, the Millat itself was torn between two groups - the modern' and the orthodox'. The former group had developed a blind faith in Western sciences and civilization. It stood for the total and uncritical adoption of the Western system of instruction and education. The latter group, on the other hand, reposed in implicit faith in the infallibility of the way of earlier Ulama. It held the syllabi of instruction laid down by them to be absolute and final. A slightest alteration, according to this group, amounted to apostasy and perversion.


Religion and the religious sciences had fallen a prey to these excesses. Moderateness had become extinct.


The dangers of this situation were realised by some sincere and far-sighted religious scholars who were firm and staunch in their belief in the doctrines of Islam and held a high and venerable place in the Millat on account of their piety and learning. They possessed wisdom and a vision that was broad and enlightened. They came from Shaikh-ul-islam Hazrat Shah Waliullah's line of disciples. The guide and leader of this earnest group of men was Maulana Mohammed Ali Mongeri who was an outstanding theologian and spiritual mentor of his time. He had been the most favourite pupil of Maulana Lutfullah Saheb of Aligarh and was the Khalifa-i-Majaz Spiritual successor of Maulana Shah Fazlur Rahman of Gani Moradabad.


These venerable after discussing and corresponding with the other Muslim divines of their time decided finally to establish a religious and educational Association. The  main object of this Association was to bring about harmony and co-operation among the different groups within the Muslim Millat, and thereby to bring about the  moral, religious and educational reform and progress of the Muslims.


The Association was named as Nadwatul Ulama and its first session was hold at Kanpur in1893 (A. H. 131 1) under the presidentship of Maulana Lutfullah Saheb of Aligarh. In this session the call was given for resolving the differences among the Ulama for creating an atmosphere of unity and co-operation and for bringing about suitable changes and improvements in the out-dated syllabi of the Arabic Madrasas.

Nadwatul Ulama Association held annual session in different cities. But it was soon felt that unless some practical steps were taken to translate these ideals into action, it will not be understood and appreciated by the Muslim masses.

The first step, accordingly, was taken in 1898 (A. H. 1316) with the establishment of a Darul Uloom which soon earned for itself a place in India and abroad as a modern seat of Muslim theological learning. This institution was named Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama, was established at Lucknow which is the capital of Uttar Pradesh, the biggest state of India, and an important centre of Muslim culture for many centuries.

Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama was established on the principle of a balanced synthesis of the classical education with the modern. Its chief purpose was:

(a) to evolve a proper integration between the eternal fundamentals of the faith and ever-changing values of human knowledge and learning and,

(b) to bring about harmony and cohesion among the different groups and schools of thought of Ahl-i-Sunnat Muslims.

As Islamic sciences are living, evolving and progressive and education was subject to the law of change and reform, hence it was essential that the system of education too, should change and evolve with time for needs of Islamic Millat.

http://www.nadwatululama.org/intr.htm#m